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Article
Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-Feminist Critique of
Title IX’s Vision for Gender Equity in Sports
DIONNE L. KOLLER
Title IX as applied to athletics is a high-profile, controversial public policy
effort that has opened up the world of athletics to millions of girls and women. Yet
as it is both celebrated for the opportunities it has created for women, and decried
as going too far at the expense of men, a reality persists that women do not pursue
or remain committed to sport in numbers comparable to men. This Article seeks to
explore this phenomenon by moving the discourse beyond the debate over whether
women are inherently as “interested” in sport as men to examine the conception
of equality incorporated into Title IX and how this might affect women’s interest in
participating in sport. In doing so, this Article asserts that it is not at all clear that
greater Title IX enforcement alone can serve to stimulate interest in the population
of girls and women who do not currently participate in sport. This is because Title
IX’s anti-discrimination mandate only serves to secure opportunities for females
to assimilate into a model for sport—emphasizing elite ability and commercial
appeal—which was constructed by and for males. This model, incorporated into
Title IX through the requirement that schools must only provide opportunities to
female athletes who are “interested” and have the “ability” to play varsity-level
sport, can in many cases create what this Article describes as an “interest
paradox,” extinguishing the interest of those girls and women who would engage
in sport, but are not willing to assimilate into the current model. While this Article
supports the position that greater Title IX enforcement is a worthy goal, it argues
that the time has come for a new sport policy that can incorporate fully women’s
voices in education-based athletics and redefine norms for sport participation so
that the benefits of such participation may be enjoyed by a greater population of
females.
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Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-Feminist Critique of
Title IX’s Vision for Gender Equity in Sports
DIONNE L. KOLLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1989 movie Field of Dreams,1 Kevin Costner plays an Iowa corn
farmer who hears voices which he interprets as urging him to build a
baseball field on his property. The movie made popular the phrase, “[i]f
you build it, [they] will come,” and indeed, once Costner’s character built
the field, the ghosts of several legendary baseball players appeared and
enjoyed the game once more.2 The narrative of Title IX has focused on the
power of the “if you build it, they will come” mantra, with advocates
stressing and courts reinforcing the notion that creating opportunities will
attract women and girls to participate in sport.3 Like the magical
appearance of the players in Field of Dreams, it is said that simply
providing opportunities for women to participate in education-based
athletics programs on an equal basis with men will encourage legions of
women to develop the interest and ability to play.
The “Field of Dreams” theory has to an impressive extent worked.
Prior to the enactment of Title IX, less than 32,000 women participated in
intercollegiate athletics.4 Now, there are more than 174,000 female
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Center for Sport and the Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law. Thanks to Kimberly Brown, Adam Connolly, Amy Dillard, Michele Gilman, Margaret
Johnson, Robert Lande, Marcia McCormick, Audrey McFarlane, Michael Meyerson, and Amy Sloan
for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Dean Philip Closius and the University of Baltimore School
of Law for generously supporting the development of this Article through the University of Baltimore
School of Law summer research stipend program. I am grateful to Susan Lee and Jessica
Smoluchowski for outstanding assistance with research. This Article was presented at the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools 2010 New Scholar workshop. This Article is dedicated to my mother, for
whom a drive was never too long and a bake sale never too much trouble in the support of my athletic
dreams.
1
FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
2
Id.
3
DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS
REVOLUTION 94 (2010) (“Our experience with Title IX in recent decades serves as empirical evidence
that the court’s instincts in Cohen v. Brown University[, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996)] were right on the
mark: if you build it, they will come.”); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 113 (2006) (explaining that the theory of equality espoused in Title IX cases “exemplifies
what we might call the Field of Dreams approach to women’s sports programs: ‘If you build it, they
will come’”).
4
Jocelyn Samuels, Reviewing the Play: How Faulty Premises Affected the Work of the
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics and Why Title IX Protections Are Still Needed to Ensure
Equal Opportunity in Athletics, 3 MARGINS 233, 242 (2003).
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5

intercollegiate athletes. Female participation in interscholastic athletics
has grown by more than 900%,6 with about 294,000 girls participating in
high school athletics in 1971, and over three million in 2007–2008.7
However, the goal of full, robust athletic participation for women on par
with that for men still has not been realized.8 Acknowledging this fact, the
scholarly discourse on Title IX largely has focused on the debate between
those who say that women are interested in sports, and that lagging
participation rates reflect continuing discrimination, and those who argue
that, in fact, women are simply not as interested in sports as men. Thus,
Title IX critics assert that there are inherent differences in the level of
interest in athletics between men and women, rather than discrimination by
educational institutions.9 In their view, Title IX is being implemented in a
way that discriminates against male athletes by requiring institutions to
impose gender-based quotas that short-change male athletes in order to
give participation opportunities to less-interested females.10 Title IX
proponents defend Title IX against this backlash11 by citing the law’s
5
DENISE M. DEHASS, 1981–82 TO 2006–07 NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION
RATES REPORT 61 (2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4124-participation-rates1981-82-2006-07-ncaa-sports-sponsorship-and-participation-rates-report.aspx.
6
Samuels, supra note 4, at 242; WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., PLAY FAIR: A TITLE IX PLAYBOOK
FOR VICTORY 4 (2009) [hereinafter WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., PLAY FAIR], available at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/Content/Articles/Issues/Title-IX/P/Playing-Fair-A-Guide-toTitle-IX.aspx.
7
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., PLAY FAIR, supra note 6, at 4.
8
LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 109 (explaining Title IX’s success but noting that “much
work remains”).
9
Ross A. Jurewitz, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX Enforcement in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283, 332–33 (2000) (asserting that female students are
not as interested in athletics as male students and that men compete at all levels in far greater numbers
than women); see also JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX AND
TITLE IX 68 (2002) (explaining that female students do not sign up for sports because they do not want
to sit on the bench); George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What Is Gender Equity?, 2 VILL
SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 25, 29 (1995) (explaining that “[o]ther evidence suggests that a greater
percentage of men have an interest in making athletic competition a part of their college experience”);
Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coach’s View, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (1996) (“In each of my ten years of coaching, despite coming from a
student body that is regularly more female than male . . . more men consistently have turned out to
participate than women. While broader social forces may be at work, the encouragement and support
for the women here appears to be equal . . . . Yet more men than women choose to participate in
athletics at the college level. This is not an experience limited to my school. It is a national
experience.” (footnotes omitted)).
10
See, e.g., Jurewitz, supra note 9, at 335 (describing how Title IX compliance methods
“discriminately affect male athletes”).
11
Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal
for Reform, 91 IOWA L. REV. 821, 860–61 (2006) (“Pervasive rhetoric maintains that Title IX is
‘reverse discrimination’ that benefits female athletes only at the expense of men. This erroneous belief
has fueled political and judicial challenges to the proportionality prong of OCR’s compliance test.”
(footnotes omitted)). This backlash has included numerous lawsuits seeking to challenge Title IX and
its implementing regulations, such as National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Department of Education,
366 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2004), as well as Congressional testimony urging a change to the statute
and implementing regulations. See Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Before
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training and Life-Long Learning of the H. Comm. on Econ.
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successes and asserting that women are just as interested in sports as
men.12 They counter the critics by arguing that lower levels of interest and
participation are the result of continuing discrimination by educational
institutions and societal forces which discourage girls’ and women’s
participation in sport.13 These scholars and advocates call for increased
Title IX enforcement to realize what is thought to be Title IX’s full
potential—greater overall participation in sport for women and girls.14
Congress and courts thus far have adopted this view, uniformly rejecting
the notion that women are not as interested in athletics as men.15 This
polarization of positions—between those who say women are not as
interested in sport as men and those who assert they are—has prevented a
more nuanced examination of what girls and women may or may not be
interested in when it comes to participation in sports, and how the current
structure of education-based16 athletics programs might shape that interest.
Indeed, what is lost in the debate over how far Title IX has gone to remedy
discrimination in athletics, and how far it needs to go, is whether Title IX’s
anti-discrimination mandate, even if fully enforced, can deliver the benefits
it is hoped to deliver. That is, while an equality framework might be
necessary to secure the benefits of sports participation for women and girls,
given its current form, is it sufficient?
This Article seeks to answer that question by deconstructing Title IX to
determine whether its conception of discrimination in sports, and
corresponding “Field of Dreams” approach to gender equity, is still
sufficient to produce the hoped-for goal of encouraging women and girls to
participate in sports and reap its benefits. In doing so, this Article
acknowledges that there can be little doubt that discrimination in the form
of second-class treatment for female athletes is still a fact of life. There
and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong. 146 (1995) (statement of T.J. Kerr, President of the National
Wrestling Coaches Association) (“The unfair and discriminatory [Office of Civil Rights] rules are
creating anger and resentment among males . . . .”).
12
Samuels, supra note 4, at 242 (“The factual record confirms that the notion that women are not
interested in athletics is simply an outmoded stereotype.”).
13
Gayle I. Horwitz, Athletics, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 311, 314 (2004) (“Women’s groups . . .
argue that women participate in sports at lower rates than men due to past discrimination.”).
14
Deborah Brake, Revisiting Title IX’s Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the Three-Part Test, 12
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 458 (2004) [hereinafter Brake, Feminist Legacy] (“Title IX’s
legacy is not one of unmitigated success. Like other social institutions, sport has been resilient in
preserving male privilege in its deepest structures.”); Samuels, supra note 4, at 237 (“[D]espite
dramatic gains since the enactment of Title IX, the playing field is still far from level.”).
15
See Samuels, supra note 4, at 240 (“However, as Congress and the courts have consistently
recognized, the stereotype that women are less interested in sports than men as well as the use of
interest surveys to bolster that assumption, is belied by the purpose of Title IX and contradicted by its
history.”).
16
Although sports participation occurs in many different settings, such as through private clubs,
AAU leagues, and the like, it is sports in the educational setting that has the greatest impact because
high schools, colleges, and universities support most organized sports programs in the United States. It
is this setting, of course, to which Title IX applies, because these institutions receive the federal
funding that is a condition precedent to application of the statute.
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can also be little doubt that this second-class treatment is at least part of the
reason why women do not take up, or continue in, sport at the same rate as
men. The question then is not whether Title IX’s premise that women are
entitled to equal athletic opportunity is correct, but whether the conception
of equality embedded in Title IX is sufficient to reach that goal. This
Article asserts that Title IX in fact cannot effectuate what is thought to be
its full promise, because the conception of equality underlying Title IX
assumes that women will be interested in assimilating17 into the model for
sport created by and for men. As a result, women who might be interested
in athletics are forced to either assimilate into the male-constructed model
for sport which emphasizes elite ability, commercial appeal, and a win-atall-costs mentality, or not play at all. Such a fact produces what I refer to
as an “interest paradox,” whereby Title IX’s participation opportunities at
the interscholastic and intercollegiate levels18 serve to extinguish interest in
sports participation for the very group of women that the statute and
regulations are intended to reach. Accordingly, while purporting to
address gender discrimination in sport, Title IX perpetuates gender
discrimination of a different character by denying women and girls the
opportunity to enjoy a model for sport which speaks equally to males and
females.
Part II of this Article explains the promise of Title IX, through the
statute, regulations and its theoretical underpinnings which assume that
creating opportunities for women to be student-athletes will encourage
more women to be involved in sport. This Part also explains the important
lifetime benefits of sports participation and the problem as it exists today,
with a continuing lack of participation by girls and women seemingly
signaling that they are still not as interested in sport as boys and men. Part
III deconstructs Title IX with an eye toward explaining what a potential
female athlete might be interested in. This Part asserts that Title IX’s
conception of equality is far more limited than commonly believed, with
the statute and regulations ultimately resting on a formal equality approach
which requires women and girls to assimilate into the male-constructed,
varsity model for sport. This Part explains that the prevailing view that
creating more opportunities to assimilate will develop women’s interest in
sports relies on an essentialized understanding of what women want from
17

See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1143 (1986) (explaining that the equal treatment or
equality doctrine used to create change in the workplace assumed the goal was assimilation into the
male model).
18
Because “[t]he United States is one of the few countries in the world that operates the majority
of its public sport programs within schools and universities,” the kind of opportunities for sport that are
offered through educational programs are important in shaping interest and setting the standard for
ability to participate in sports. Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 104th Cong.
183–84 (1995) (statement of Donna Lopiano, Executive Director, Women’s Sports Foundation).
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sports. This limited conception of equality combined with an essentialized
understanding of women and sport can create an “interest paradox,” so that
opportunities created in the varsity sports model can actually serve to
discourage participation for those the law hopes to inspire. Part IV offers
suggestions for mitigating the interest paradox, by moving to a more
gender-neutral, broad-based model for education-based sports.
II. TITLE IX: THE PROMISE AND THE PROBLEM
Title IX’s story is a complex one. In one respect, the statute and
implementing regulations have been an enormous success. Opportunities
for female athletes and support for female athletic participation have never
been greater. The term “Title IX” itself connotes female power and
success in athletics.19 On the other hand, there remains a troubling reality
that female athletic participation still lags far behind that for males, and
data show that girls and women are at greater risk for suffering the social
and physical consequences of a sedentary lifestyle than boys and men.20
Courts and commentators adopt the view that providing equality of
opportunity to participate in education-based athletics programs will spark
an interest in athletic participation and encourage even more females to get
off the sidelines.21 Nearly four decades after Title IX was passed, the
narrative of opportunity to participate as a catalyst for developing interest
19
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999) (“And the
victorious athletes understood as well as anyone the connection between a 27-year-old statute and
tangible progress in women’s athletics.”). It has even been noted that “Title IX may be the first federal
law to have achieved true pop status.” LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 107.
20
JOHN CHESLOCK, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., WHO’S PLAYING COLLEGE SPORTS? TRENDS IN
PARTICIPATION 3 (2007) [hereinafter CHESLOCK, WHO’S PLAYING COLLEGE SPORTS?], available at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/Content/Research-Reports/Whos-Playing-CollegeSports.aspx (“Women’s participation still lags far behind men’s participation levels. For the average
higher education institution in the complete four-year/1,895 institutions sample, the female share of
undergraduate enrollment in 2004–05 was 55.8% while the female share of athletes was only 41.7%.
For the complete four-year/1,895 institutions sample, the reported number of men’s participants in
2004–05 was 291,797, while the corresponding number for women was 205,492. In combination,
these figures demonstrate that as of 2004–05, only 41% of athletic participants were women and
151,149 female athletes would need to have been added (assuming no reduction in male participants) to
reach a share of 55%, the female share of full-time undergraduates in the fall of 2004.”); WOMEN’S
SPORTS FOUND., GENDER GAP–—RANK ORDER 2007–2008, (2009) [hereinafter WOMEN’S SPORTS
FOUND., GENDER GAP], available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/Content/Articles/Issues/
Participation/M/Mind-the-Gap-Women-Still-Underrepresented-in-High-School-Athletics.aspx (“Girls
receive over 1.3 million less participation opportunities than boys at the high school level.”); WOMEN’S
SPORTS FOUND., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON IT: SPORT, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND THE HEALTH AND WELLBEING OF AMERICAN GIRLS 4 (2004) [hereinafter WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON
IT], available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/Content/Research-Reports/Her-LifeDepends-On-It-II.aspx (stating that “[n]early one out of every two high school boys plays sports, while
only one in three high school girls participates”).
21
Marcia D. Greenberger & Neena K. Chaudhry, Worth Fighting For: Thirty-Five Years of Title
IX Advocacy in the Courts, Congress and the Federal Agencies, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 491, 492 (2007)
(stating that “the lesson of Title IX is that young women have flocked to play sports when given the
chance”).
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has continued, with the assertion that while there are now more women and
girls than ever participating in sports, there is still more work to be done to
eliminate discrimination and realize fully gender equity in sports.22 How
best to achieve equality of opportunity and secure the benefits of sports
participation for females that have long been enjoyed by males is both the
promise and problem confronted by Title IX.
A. The Statute and Regulations
Title IX was enacted by Congress in 1972 to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of gender in all education programs receiving federal financial
assistance.23 The purpose of the statute is to guarantee that “all
students . . . have equitable opportunities to participate in [an] educational
program.”24 It was enacted as a response to “evidence of ‘massive,
persistent patterns of discrimination against women in the academic
world.’”25 The statute states that: “No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”26
Title IX was not specifically targeted at nor does it mention athletics
programs. Therefore, the statute itself does not provide a vision for
equality in athletics. Indeed, the issue of discrimination against women in
education-based athletic programs was only a brief part of the
congressional debates on Title IX.27 After the statute was passed, however,
there were attempts to limit its effect on athletic programs,28 with the
strongest resistance to Title IX coming from the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”), at that time the governing body for men’s
intercollegiate sports.29 Those efforts ultimately failed and Congress
22

Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 18–19 (2001) [hereinafter Brake, Sex Equality]; Greenberger & Chaudhry,
supra note 21, at 501.
23
Horwitz, supra note 13, at 312.
24
Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, to Nancy S.
Footer, Gen. Counsel, Bowling Green State Univ. (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter O’Shea Letter],
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html.
25
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)).
26
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
27
McCormick ex rel. Geldwert v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh)).
28
For instance, Senator Tower attempted to limit the coverage of Title IX to non-revenue
producing sports. See 120 CONG. REC. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (“The amendment
will except only those sports which provide gross revenues and only to the extent that the revenues are
necessary to support such revenue-producing athletic activities.”).
29
SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
WOMEN’S SPORT 254 (1994) (stating that NCAA executive director Walter Byers announced “that
Title IX would spell the ‘possible doom of intercollegiate sports’”).
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instead directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
prepare regulations implementing Title IX, including in the area of
“intercollegiate athletic activities.”31 These regulations provide the
framework through which equality in athletics is mandated. The final
regulations, which were published and went into effect in 1975, provide
that: “No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient . . . .”32
Neither the statute nor the regulations interpreting Title IX require that
covered educational programs give preferential treatment to women.33
Instead, Title IX requires entities that receive federal financial assistance to
“provide equal athletic opportunity for . . . both sexes.”34 Notably, the
regulations evidence the fact that athletics is a unique context in which to
impose an equality mandate.35 Therefore, schools are permitted to have
separate athletic programs for men and women.36 Moreover, Title IX does
30
In 1979, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare split into the Department of
Education, which now has the authority to enforce Title IX, and the Department of Health and Human
Services. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 201, 93 Stat. 668, 671
(1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (2006)) (establishing the Department of Education); id. § 509(a),
93 Stat. at 695 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3508(a) (2006)).
31
Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)). Although the regulations and policy interpretations frequently speak of
“intercollegiate” athletics, courts have interpreted the provisions to apply to interscholastic athletics as
well. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290 (applying policy interpretation to interscholastic athletics); Horner
v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The Policy Interpretation states
that its general principles will often apply to interscholastic athletic programs, and has been held to
apply to such programs.”).
32
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2009).
33
See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“Title IX does not require recipients of federal funding to grant preferential treatment to members of
one sex . . . .”); Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (“After all, §
1681(b) states that Title IX does not require any education institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any
federally supported program or activity . . . .”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 164 (1st Cir.
1996) (“Title IX also specifies that its prohibition against gender discrimination shall not ‘be
interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist’ between the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex participating in any federally supported program or activity, and ‘the
total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other area.’”);
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 908 (M.D. La. 1996) (“After establishing that sex
discrimination is prohibited, Title IX then proceeds to clarify that efforts to remedy historical sex
discrimination shall not include preferential or disparate treatment of one sex over another . . . .”).
34
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2009).
35
BRAKE, supra note 3, at 19, (citing WELCH SUGGS, A PLACE ON THE TEAM: THE TRIUMPH AND
TRAGEDY OF TITLE IX 42–43 (Princeton Univ. Press 2005)).
36
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2009) (“[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport.”); O’Shea Letter, supra note 24 (“Title IX requires that [intercollegiate
athletic] scholarships be made available to the separate men’s and women’s athletic programs in a
manner which is ‘substantially proportionate’ to the participation rates of male and female athletes.”).
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not require institutions to offer males and females the same sport offerings
or mandate that male and female sports programs receive equal funding.37
Title IX requires, however, that opportunities for separate programs be
equitable.38
To determine whether a school provides equal athletic opportunity, the
regulations state that it must be determined “whether the selection of sports
and levels of competition39 effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes.”40 In 1979, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare issued a Policy Interpretation which explained that
for the purposes of athletics, Title IX compliance was measured in three
areas: (1) athletic scholarships; (2) other program areas (represented by
factors two through ten as listed in the regulations);41 and (3) the
accommodation of the interests and abilities of male and female students
(derived from the first factor of the regulations).42
Effective accommodation of male and female students’ interests and
abilities through adequate participation opportunities is measured by
compliance with the well-known “three-part test,” outlined in the 1979
Policy Interpretation, which provides that an institution effectively
accommodates the interests and abilities of its male and female students if
it meets any one of three benchmarks:
37

ELLEN J. VARGYAS, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL
GUIDE TO TITLE IX 21, 26 (1994) (explaining that “[t]he number of teams offered to men and women is
irrelevant,” institutions are generally not required to offer any particular sport, and discrimination is
determined not by the “amount of money spent, but what the money buys”).
38
O’Shea Letter, supra note 24 (stating that Title IX “requires institutions to provide equitable
opportunities to both male and female athletes in all aspects of its two separate athletic programs”).
39
See VARGYAS, supra note 37, at 15 n.69 (“Title IX also prohibits discrimination in intramural
and club (non-varsity) athletics. However, opportunities in intramural and club teams cannot be used to
offset a lack of opportunities in varsity intercollegiate athletics.”).
40
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2009). The regulations list ten factors to consider in determining
whether equal opportunities exist: “(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; (2) The provision of
equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time; (4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of
coaches and tutors; (7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provision of
medical training facilities and services; (9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10)
Publicity.” Id.
41
Policy Interpretation of Title IX, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (Dec. 11, 1979) (noting that “the
governing principle” in determining “Compliance in Other Program Areas” is that “male and female
athletes should receive equivalent treatment, benefits, and opportunities”); see also 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c) (listing the ten factors that are represented in the policy interpretation).
42
Policy Interpretation of Title IX, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414 (stating that one section of the policy
interpretation governs “Compliance in Meeting the Interests and Abilities of Male and Female
Students”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (stating that the first factor to be considered when
determining whether equal opportunities are available is “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes”). Claims in
this area are often “referred to as ‘accommodation’ claims and generally relate to a school’s allocation
of athletic participation opportunities to its male and female students.” McCormick ex rel. Geldwert v.
Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 291 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). Most circuit
court opinions have dealt with this area of compliance. Id.
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(1) Whether
intercollegiate
level
participation
opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex;
or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion . . . whether
it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the
members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program.43
Every court to consider the issue has held that the regulations and
Policy Interpretation are entitled to deference.44 Courts have stated that
“[t]he degree of deference is particularly high in Title IX cases because
Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing
standards for athletic programs under Title IX.”45 Moreover, every court to
consider the issue has held that the regulations and Policy Interpretation
are constitutional.46 While the regulations and policy interpretations apply
directly to high school and college athletics programs whose institutions
receive federal funding, their reach is even greater. As one sports scholar
43
Policy Interpretation of Title IX, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. In 1996, the Department of Education
Office for Civil Rights issued a Policy Clarification, which explained that the first prong of the test is a
“‘safe harbor’” and not a requirement. Dear Colleague Letter, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, (Jan. 16,
1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html.
44
See McCormick, 370 F.3d at 288, 290 (stating that the Department of Education’s regulations
interpreting Title IX are entitled to deference, that the parties agree the Policy Interpretation is entitled
to deference, and that other circuits have deferred to the Policy Interpretation); Miami Univ. Wrestling
Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Consistent with the precedent of this court
and various other courts, we conclude that the Policy Interpretation is entitled to deference.”); Chalenor
v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Policy Interpretation is entitled
to deference); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the Policy Interpretation is entitled to “substantial deference by the courts”); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35
F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 is entitled to deference); Roberts v.
Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We defer substantially to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations.”); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating that the Policy Interpretation is accorded “appreciable deference”); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that the Policy Interpretation is accorded “appreciable
deference”).
45
McCormick, 370 F.3d at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
Id.; Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88 (W.D.Va. 2007).
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has explained “[w]hile Title IX would have no official impact beyond
federally-funded educational institutions, its clearly stated stance against
discrimination advanced a principle of equality” which serves to pressure
amateur and professional sports organizations to provide greater access and
valuation of women’s athletics.47
B. The Goals of Title IX
In addition to understanding the statute and regulations, it is useful to
review Title IX’s goals and the reasons why equality of opportunity to
participate in athletics matters. Courts and scholars have stated that Title
IX’s goal is to encourage women to participate in sports by giving them
equal participation opportunities.48 There are several reasons why this is
important. There is, of course, the fact that “equality” as a value is an
important end in itself. Education-based athletics are high-profile activities
sponsored by taxpayer-supported institutions, and allocating resources
inequitably on the basis of gender is morally unjust because gender
provides no relevant basis to distinguish between athletes who are entitled
to participation opportunities and those who are not. The problem, of
course, is that athletic participation opportunities cannot simply be
distributed like a loaf of bread or article of clothing. To take advantage of
the opportunity being distributed, the recipient must be interested in it and
commit to receive it. That is, she must want to engage in sports. Feminist
legal scholars and Title IX advocates therefore have focused on the
benefits that are derived from developing such interest and commitment.
First, Kimberly Yuracko has argued that distributing athletic
participation opportunities through the proportionality requirement of the
three-part test is justified because of government’s important role in
promoting “certain widely shared conceptions of the good in order to
improve the quality of individuals’ lives.”49 Yuracko argues that the
proportionality prong of the three-part test may be justified as “one key
part in a larger project of cultural transformation” that will “reconstruct the
47

CAHN, supra note 29, at 251.
See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]
central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage women to participate in sports: The increased
number of roster sports and scholarships reserved for women would gradually increase demand among
women for those roster spots and scholarships.”); BRAKE, supra note 3, at 79 (explaining that courts
have consistently applied the third prong of the three-part test “in accordance with the law’s goals of
encouraging the growth of opportunities for women and nurturing the development of women’s athletic
interests and abilities”).
49
Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 789−90 (2003)
(citing GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 3 (1997)); id. at 791
(“The proportionality requirement may be best understood and explained as an attempt to promote
certain widely shared values about the kinds of skills and attributes that girls and boys should be
encouraged to develop.”).
48
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social reality and social meanings” that devalue women’s participation in
athletics.50 Thus, Yuracko explains that equitable distribution of athletic
opportunities is important because it may:
[E]ncourage girls to think of themselves and their bodies in a
different way by tagging competitive physical activity as in
equal part female, rather than exclusively male. [Equitable
distribution] may, therefore, be part of a larger project to
change the social meaning attached to femaleness from
passive beauty or sex object to strong physical agent.51
Beyond the larger social goals associated with gender equity in sports,
distributing equitably education-based sports opportunities is crucial
because studies have shown that sports participation provides important
lifetime benefits to participants.52 As a result, the importance of Title IX
and the urgency to provide gender equity in sport is directly tied to the fact
that sports participation can provide important life lessons and help
develop significant life skillslessons and skills that have long been
enjoyed almost exclusively by males.53 Indeed, there is a substantial body
of literature that documents the benefits of sport participation. For
instance, sport is said to teach important life lessons such as discipline,
teamwork, time management, and leadership that “further long-term
personal growth, independence and wellbeing.”54 Moreover, athletic
opportunities are said to create numerous benefits for women and girls,
including better physical and mental health, higher self-esteem, a lower
rate of depression, and positive body image, as well as the development of
responsible social behaviors, greater educational success, and inter-

50

Id. at 795−96.
Id. at 796.
52
See Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 458 (describing the physical, academic, and social
benefits girls receive when they compete in sports); Tara Parker-Pope, As Girls Become Women, Sports
Pay Dividends, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (Feb. 15, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/02/15/as-girls-become-women-sports-pay-dividends/ (describing studies that provide strong
evidence that team sports “can result in lifetime improvements to educational, work and health
prospects”).
53
See Jessica E. Jay, Women’s Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 1−2 (1997) (citing Eleanor Mallet, Everywoman: Letting Girls Have a Sporting
Chance, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.), Oct. 3, 1995, at 1E (quoting a Nike advertisement transcript in which
girls on a swing set ask boys to let them play catch so they can reap the benefits of sports)); id. at
10−17 (discussing the documented benefits of participation in sports); Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and
the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381,
444−45 (2000) (explaining that without equal athletic opportunity, women will “necessarily be
dominated by their physically more developed and stronger [male] mates”).
54
See Deborah L. Brake & Verna L. Williams, The Heart of the Game: Putting Race and
Educational Equity at the Center of Title IX, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 235 (2008) (explaining
that a good “case for expanding girls’ sports opportunities would examine how sports help all young
people learn important lessons”).
51
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personal skills. Research shows that physical activity reduces female risk
of cardiovascular disease56 and physically active women are less likely to
get diseases such as breast cancer.57 Athletic activity, especially as a
youth, is believed to stimulate healthy bone growth.58 Research also shows
that athletic activity promotes positive social behaviors, including better
academic performance59 and lower rates of smoking, drug use, and
pregnancy.60
Sports participation also provides social benefits that are carried
throughout life,61 including a woman’s professional life.62 Studies have
shown that girls’ participation in sport had a powerful impact on women’s
education and employment, with sport participation accounting for twenty
percent of the increase in women’s education and forty percent of the
increase in women’s employment for women twenty-five to thirty-four
years old.63 Moreover, some studies have shown that girls’ sport
participation led to a lower risk of obesity twenty to twenty-five years
later.64 Given the growing numbers of children, and especially girls, who
are overweight and suffering the lifelong physical and emotional effects,
equal opportunity to participate in sport—both encouraging an interest in it
See Implementation of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978: Hearing on P.L. 95−606 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 104th Cong. 1218 (Oct. 18, 1995) (statement of Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Sec’y for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.) (“[G]irls who participate in sports are three times more likely to
graduate from high school, 80 percent less likely to have an unwanted pregnancy, and 92 percent less
likely to use drugs.”); Greenberger & Chaudhry, supra note 21, at 492 (“Females who participate in
athletics benefit from greater academic success, responsible social behaviors, a multitude of health
benefits, and increased personal skills. Female student-athletes have higher grades, are less likely to
drop out, and have higher graduation rates than their non-athletic peers.” (footnotes omitted)); Samuels,
supra note 4, at 242 (“Competitive sports promote physical and psychological health, responsible
social behaviors, greater academic success, and better personal skills.” (footnotes omitted)).
56
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON IT, supra note 20, at 8.
57
Id. at 9.
58
Id. at 12.
59
Id. at 30; see also Council on Sports Med. and Fitness and Council on School Health, Active
Healthy Living: Prevention of Childhood Obesity Through Increased Physical Activity, 117
PEDIATRICS 1834, 1836 (2006), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/117/
5/1834 (explaining that the health benefits of athletics for children include weight loss and improved
insulin sensitivity, blood pressure, and self-esteem); Cardiovascular Benefits of Daily Exercise in
School Children Are Evident Even After One Year, SCIENCEDAILY, (May 10, 2009),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/05/090508045318.htm (explaining that children as young
as eleven benefit from daily exercise).
60
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON IT, supra note 20, at 3–4.
61
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce &
Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 104th Cong. 190 (1995) (statement of Donna
A. Loppiano, Exec. Dir., Women’s Sports Found.); see also Council on Sports Med. and Fitness and
Council on Sch. Health, supra note 59, at 1834–38.
62
Sangree, supra note 53, at 444 (“[Eighty percent] of women identified as key leaders in Fortune
500 companies participated in sports during their childhood and self-identified as having been
‘tomboys.’ . . . Several studies describing the glass ceiling in corporations conclude that women’s lack
of competitive team sports experience disadvantages them for career advancement.”).
63
Parker-Pope, supra note 52.
64
Id.
55
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and sustaining it—is an important public policy issue.
C. The Problem
Since its enactment in 1972, Title IX as applied to athletics has
received much-deserved acclaim. The law’s ability to change the culture
surrounding women’s participation in athletics and bring increasing
numbers of women into sport has been dramatic.65 Courts consistently
have upheld Title IX’s anti-discrimination mandate, and statistics have
demonstrated that eliminating discrimination by creating opportunities for
girls and women to participate in athletics can inspire greater interest in
participation. Indeed, at least some scholars have stated that “Title IX is
generally viewed as having fixed the problem of gender equality in
sports . . . .”66
Yet despite the encouraging statistics, it seems that Title IX has not
continued to have the wide-ranging impact on sports participation for
which advocates and public officials hoped. Indeed, social science
research paints a troubling picture of females’ participation in sport, with
large numbers participating during the elementary school years and then
quitting as teenagers.67 Many more do not participate at all.68 Indeed, over
the last decade, women and girls’ participation in sport has plateaued.69
Moreover, social scientists have noted that children’s participation in sport
has resulted in what can be described as a “bi-modal” curve.70 On one
65

Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 18.
EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT
EQUAL IN SPORTS 29 (2008).
67
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., GO OUT AND PLAY: YOUTH SPORTS IN AMERICA 128 (2008),
available
at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/Content/Research-Reports/Go-Out-andPlay.aspx (showing that by sixth grade more girls than boys begin to drop out of sports).
68
Id. at 129 (showing that from third to twelfth grade, regardless of their community, generally
more girls than boys had never participated in organized sport).
69
BRAKE, supra note 3, at 223 (explaining that women’s college athletic participation rates have
“stayed relatively flat since 2003” and that “gains at the high school level also appear to be
diminishing”).
70
Frank Brady, Children’s Organized Sports: A Developmental Perspective, J. PHYSICAL EDUC.
RECREATION & DANCE, Feb. 2004, at 35, 36 (discussing how the early introduction to and subsequent
rise in sports participation is accompanied by the premature departure of a substantial number of the
young participants, and noting how data indicate that sports participation peaks at age eleven, and is
then followed by steady decline through the remainder of the teen years); Laura J. Burton, Rethinking a
Commitment to Olympic Sports for Girls, J. PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE, Nov.–Dec. 2008,
at 5, 5; Russell Ellis, Sports Participation in Children: When to Begin?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
SPORTS SAFETY, http://www.sportssafety.org/articles/print/children-sports-participation (“On the one
hand, our children are becoming more sedentary compared to children of past generations, which helps
to explain a corresponding rise in the prevalence of childhood obesity. On the other hand, childhood
participation in organized sports is at an all-time high and the participants, especially those training to
become ‘elite’ athletes, are getting younger and younger.”); Health Benefits for Children Who Play
Sports, ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS, http://www.athleticscholarships.net/benefits-risks-youth-sport.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (noting the “very real contradiction that while too many kids are inactive—
contributing to an increased risk of obesity and diabetes . . . kids who are active are experiencing
66
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curve are children who fail to meet minimum daily physical activity
requirements as set by numerous sport and health organizations.71
Included in this curve are a significant percentage of girls who are
classified as overweight.72 Data show that girls in high school are
significantly less likely than boys to meet daily physical activity
recommendations.73 In contrast, on the other curve are the children who
are over-training and over-specializing in sport at far too young an age,
with the result being an alarming rate of over-use and traumatic injuries.74
In short, the data show that girls still substantially lag behind boys when it
comes to sport participation, and those who do participate are products of
the youth sport culture that is characterized by as many problems as
benefits. Thus, despite strong endorsement by courts of the regulations
implementing Title IX, girls and women still do not participate in athletics
at the same rate as boys and men.75
As it stands, both Title IX’s supporters and its critics have offered
differing explanations for the persistent lag in participation rates. Critics of
Title IX argue that females are still not participating at the level of males
because females are simply not as “interested” in sports as males. They
argue the problem is that Title IX’s equality mandate goes too far because,
on a fundamental level, males and females are not similarly situated with

increasing pressures specialize in one sport and become ‘bigger, better, faster and stronger’ to obtain
college sports scholarships at progressively younger ages”).
71
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Nutrition, Prevention of Pediatric Overweight and
Obesity, 112 PEDIATRICS 424, 424–30 (2003) [hereinafter Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Prevention]
(“American children and adolescents today are less physically active as a group than were previous
generations . . . .”).
72
Id.; Burton, supra note 70, at 5–6.
73
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Prevention, supra note 71, at 1835 (noting that “inactivity is twice as
common among females (14%) as males (7%)” and that “[b]oys were approximately 20% more active
than girls, and mean activity levels decreased with age by 2.7% per year in boys compared with 7.4%
per year in girls”); Burton, supra note 70, at 5.
74
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Sports Med. & Fitness, Intensive Training and Sports
Specialization in Young Athletes, 106 PEDIATRICS 154, 154–57 (2000) [hereinafter Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, Intensive Training]; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Sports Med. & Fitness, Medical
Concerns in the Female Athlete, 106 PEDIATRICS 610, 610–13 (2000) (explaining that female athletes
are at risk for what the American Academy of Pediatrics calls the “female athlete triad”: disordered
eating, amenorrhea, and osteoporosis); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Sports Med. & Fitness,
Strength Training by Children and Adolescents, 107 PEDIATRICS, 1470, 1470–72 (2001) (“From 1991
to 1996, an estimated 20,940 to 26,120 [strength training] injuries occurred each year in individuals
under 21 years old.”).
75
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., HER LIFE DEPENDS ON IT, supra note 20 (“Nearly one out of every
two high school boys plays sports, while only one in three high school girls participates.”); WOMEN’S
SPORTS FOUND., WHO’S PLAYING COLLEGE SPORTS? TRENDS IN PARTICIPATION 3 (2007), available at
http://www.gogirlworld.org/binary-data/reportcard/fullreport.pdf (“Women’s participation still lags far
behind men’s participation levels. For the average higher education institution in the complete fouryear/1,895 institutions sample, the female share of undergraduate enrollment in 2004–05 was 55.8%
while the female share of athletes was only 41.7%. . . . [T]he reported number of men’s participants in
2004–05 was 291,797, while the corresponding number for women was 205,492. In combination,
these figures demonstrate that as of 2004–05, only 41% of athletic participants were women . . . .”).
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76

respect to interest in sport. Title IX supporters challenge this assertion
and argue that such views reflect the continuing effect of discrimination
against girls and women in sport. The argument is that females are not
participating in sport at the same rate as males because society continues to
devalue women’s sport participation, and discrimination in the form of
fewer participation opportunities and unequal treatment of female athletes
dampens interest. As currently defined by proponents of gender equity in
sport, the “problem” faced by Title IX is that its equality mandate is not
fully enforced.77 This view holds that greater enforcement and continued
development of opportunities to participate in sport, as defined by Title IX,
is the solution.
Yet the characterization of the issue as “interested” versus “not
interested,” and thus whether women are similarly situated to males,
obscures a more complex analysis of what might shape women’s desire to
participate in athletics and whether Title IX’s anti-discrimination
framework, even if fully enforced, can help. Viewed in this way,
continuing to assert the “sameness” of women to men in terms of being
interested in sport may lead to an intractable theoretical and practical
problem that obscures better solutions for achieving gender equity in sport.
Accordingly, like those feminist scholars who sought to move beyond the
sameness/difference debate of the 1980s,78 this Article seeks to move
beyond the interested/not interested debate to deconstruct Title IX and its
effect on stimulating interest in sport to explore whether it is time to
reconsider the “Field of Dreams” narrative and ask whether Title IX’s
conception of equality is the solution to stimulating interest and increasing
females’ participation in sport.
III. DECONSTRUCTING TITLE IX: EQUALITY,
ESSENTIALISM, AND THE INTEREST PARADOX
Although it universally has been presumed to increase women’s
participation in athletics through its “Field of Dreams” conception of
equality, a closer look at Title IX’s theoretical underpinnings is helpful to
understanding how it might affect women’s interest in participating in
athletics. Such an analysis reveals several issues. First, although it is
commonly lauded for taking a substantive approach to equality, Title IX at
76

LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 114–15.
Id. at 109 (stating that although Title IX has had a great deal of success, “much work remains”).
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39 (2003) (“Much of the
theorizing in the 1980s attempted to explain why the liberal feminist approach of the Equality Stage
was inadequate, particularly that the inclusion of women into male-dominated sites was not the
exclusive meaning of equality.”); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L.
REV. 803, 828–29 (1990); Mary Joe Frug, Sexual Equality and Sexual Difference in American Law, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 673–74 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal
Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1498 (1992).
77
78
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its core takes a formal equality approach, with the regulations comparing
women athletes’ “sameness” to men and requiring would-be female
student-athletes to assimilate into the male model for sport, which is
unquestionably considered the norm. Second, this approach to gender
equity in sport relies on an essentialized understanding of what a
prospective female student-athlete’s interests, abilities, and experiences
are. This essentialized vision of a female student-athlete, along with the
male norm for sport it has reinforced, has become the dominant message
sent by Title IX to females who would be athletes. The result is an
“interest paradox,” whereby Title IX has served in many cases to
extinguish the interest of those women and girls that the statute and
regulations are presumed to reach.
A. Title IX and the Limits of Formal Equality
Understanding Title IX’s theoretical approach to equality is important
because it is the content of equality in education-based athletics, as
guaranteed by Title IX that can have an impact on interest in participating
in sport. Such an examination reveals the limits of Title IX’s conception of
equality as a basis for change, as it requires female athletes to assimilate
into a male model of sport.79
Feminist scholars have articulated two versions of equality. The first
is “formal” equality, which is based on the principle that “like cases should
be treated alike,”80 and, therefore, “unlike cases should be treated
differently.”81 The principle of formal equality is, however, limited in that
it fails to define the substance of how “like” individuals should be
treated.82 Thus, under a “formal” equality approach, if men’s more
favorable treatment were changed to correspond with women’s less
favorable treatment, “formal” equality would be satisfied. Although socalled “leveling down” is permitted,83 the aspiration of Title IX is that
women be brought into the framework for athletics that men have long
enjoyed, not that the framework itself be changed. As scholars have
79
These limits have been thoughtfully examined by feminist scholars in such contexts as the
workplace, but not in sport. See generally Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987
SUP. CT. REV. 201; Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984).
80
Finley, supra note 17, at 1142 (“The ideal of equality—that similarly situated individuals
should be treated alike—is basic to our political and legal system.”); Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1294 (1987) (“The hornbook definition of
equal protection is ‘that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated’ . . . .”); Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539 (1982).
81
Cain, supra note 78, at 818.
82
Id. at 819; Westen, supra note 80, at 545–46.
83
BRAKE, supra note 3, at 129 (“Cutting men’s sports to comply with Title IX is a classic
‘leveling down’ remedy.”).
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explained, “[i]n the context of athletics, the statute likely is best known as
a tool to ensure that girls and women are treated the same as their male
counterparts.”84 To do this, a formal equality approach requires making
comparisons between those for whom equal treatment is sought.85 Thus,
arguments appealing to this version of equality require emphasizing the
similarities between men and women—that men and women are “similarly
situated.”86 This form of equality is described as the “right to equal
treatment”87 and was strongly advanced by feminists in the early 1970s,
during the time that Title IX was passed. The formal equality approach
marks what is referred to as the “Equality Stage” of feminism.88 In this
period, feminists relied on formal equality arguments to secure access for
women in many traditionally male-dominated areas such as the
professions, higher education, and the blue-collar workforce.89
In the 1980s, feminists began exploring the limits of a formal equality
analysis to effect real, meaningful change for women.90 For instance,
feminist legal scholars debated whether women needed equality with men
or special treatment, particularly in the context of workplace leave policies
for childbearing.91 Many argued that “sameness” feminists, or those
committed to formal equality, “were wrong.”92 This view is evidenced
most notably by the work of Lucinda Finley and Christine Littleton
describing the limits of a formal equality analysis,93 which Littleton called
a “symmetrical” approach to gender equality.94 Littleton explained that
one of the forms of the symmetrical vision of equality is the “assimilation
model,” or “assimilationism,”95 which is founded on the “notion that
women, given the chance, really are or could be just like men.”96 A central
84

Brake & Williams, supra note 54, at 212.
Cain, supra note 78, at 818–19; Westen, supra note 80, at 537–38 (“[E]quality is comparative,
deriving its source and its limits from the treatment of others.”).
86
Cain, supra note 78, at 819.
87
Id. at 819–20.
88
CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 23.
89
Id. at 37.
90
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 1506 (“[E]liminating ‘gender bias’ by neutralizing
husbands and wives and mothers and fathers into more equal spouses and parents (that ignored the
situated differences of these roles) helped expose how formal and rhetorical equality was not entirely
responsive to women’s needs for substantive, actual or outcome equality.” (footnote omitted)).
91
See, e.g., Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 280–82 (1998).
92
Id. at 279.
93
Finley, supra note 17, at 1120; Littleton, supra note 80, at 1291–92.
94
Littleton, supra note 80, at 1291–92 (“[One feminist approach to equality has been] to consider
the two sexes symmetrically located with regard to any issue, norm, or rule. This response, which I
term the ‘symmetrical’ approach, classifies asymmetries as illusions, ‘overbroad generalizations,’ or
temporary glitches that will disappear with a little behavior modification.” (footnote omitted)).
95
Williams, supra note 91, at 298.
96
Littleton, supra note 80, at 1292. Littleton explains that “[s]ymmetry appears to have great
appeal for the legal system” and that if society “wholeheartedly embraced the symmetrical approach of
assimilation—the point of view that ‘women are just like men’—little would need to be changed in our
85
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goal of “sameness” feminists was therefore “to allow women to assimilate
into institutions designed around masculine norms.”97
Accordingly, feminists pointed out that the prevailing equality analysis
was limited in its ability to effect change because it was built around
comparing women to a male-constructed norm. Feminists argued that an
equality analysis reflects social meanings that were constructed by a maledominated society. As such, “the rhetoric of equality compares women to
men. Women are either the same as men or different, and in either case
men have set the standard.”98 Carrie Menkel-Meadow reinforced this view,
explaining that with respect to education-based sport, advocates
had to argue that girls should be able to play with boys on
teams, while school systems argued that “physical
differences” hindered safety and other concerns that required
separation for nonequal skills. . . . [They had] called this the
claim for equality based on the sex of one; that is that women
could be equal to men, with the male gender defining the
norm.99
Thus, some feminist scholars questioned whether an equality analysis
could produce meaningful change for women.100 Although later feminist
writers have explained that all feminists “acknowledge the existence of
male norms, and argue for a world restructured to eliminate them,”101 many
have pointed out that early feminist efforts were aimed at “claiming
equality through the attributes of ‘sameness’—men and women are the
same and should have equal rights.”102 This approach, of course, has
produced great success.103 Feminist scholars have noted, however, that
“[d]espite its possibilities, the meaning of equality . . . [reflected in the law
is] limited to the concept of formal equality.”104
In contrast, feminist scholars have viewed Title IX as being something
economic or political institutions except to get rid of lingering traces of irrational prejudice.” Id. at
1293, 1301.
97
Williams, supra note 91, at 298. Lucinda Finley calls this the “‘ideal of homogenous
assimilation’ into the male norm.” Id.
98
Cain, supra note 78, at 805.
99
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 1498–99 (footnote omitted).
100
As stated by Patricia Cain: “Debates about equality have unmasked the fact of the male
standard, but seem to me unlikely to change the standard.” Cain, supra note 78, at 806; see also
Becker, supra note 79, at 201–02; Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The
Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 43 (1990) (focusing on how differences
among women may be used as a justification for continued exclusion).
101
Williams, supra note 91, at 300.
102
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 1497–98.
103
Feminist scholars have recognized that “[b]y appealing to equality and the doctrine of antidiscrimination, women have been able to make great strides toward the goal of improving their social
status and power. Equality theory has been particularly useful for gaining access to traditionally male
prerogatives within the public sphere.” Finley, supra note 17, at 1142.
104
Cain, supra note 78, at 803.
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of an exception to the formal equality approach that predominates in
American law. This is because Title IX is said to go beyond formal
equality to achieve a kind of substantive equality as well.105 As a result,
Title IX’s theoretical approach to equality, unlike that taken by Title VII
and other civil rights statutes, is thought to deliver more meaningful
change for women.106 Substantive equality is an approach which “looks to
a rule’s results or effects. It points out that equal treatment leads to
outcomes that are unequal because of differences between men and
women.”107 Indeed, it has been asserted that Title IX “takes an approach to
sex equality that is markedly different from the dominant approach
reflected in sex discrimination law generally.”108
To some extent, this is the case. Courts and scholars have long
recognized that a purely formal equality interpretation of Title IX would
achieve little, because sport traditionally has been constructed to provide
few opportunities for women.109 As a result, it was unrealistic to think that
women would have the same “interest” and “ability” to engage in sport
when opportunities to do so historically have been limited. The result of
limited opportunity is that females over time have been conditioned not to
seek athletic opportunities and participate in sports, because social
structures have worked to “anti-normalize” sports participation by women
and girls.110 Not surprisingly, this led to fewer females interested in sport
participation than males. Seizing on this, Title IX critics have argued that
women are less interested in sport and therefore not “like” men, so that it is
not necessary to take steps to achieve equal opportunity.111 Title IX
105
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1994)
(“Some substantive equality advocates favor equal treatment in some situations and special
accommodation in others, insisting, for example, on equal access for women to men’s athletic teams,
private clubs, and colleges, but on separate teams, clubs, and colleges for women to meet their special
needs.”); Brake & Williams, supra note 54, 212–13 (stating that Title IX “has substantive equality
aspects that seek to reform the institutional structures that facilitate inequality”); Buzuvis, supra note
11, at 846–47 (discussing how “formal equality requires consideration of [how] . . . gender difference is
constructed by social structures”); David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 217, 263 (2005) (“Title IX, on the other hand, looks beyond formal equality and reaches
into the realm of substantive equality.”).
106
CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 65 (“The structuralist approach found in Title IX . . . fits
comfortably under 1980s-style cultural and dominance feminist frameworks . . . .”); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 365 (2000) (stating that “women’s income relative to men’s has barely
moved; occupational segregation remains stubbornly in place for most women; women and their
children remain poor after divorce; sexual harassment, although now resisted by law, is as common as
it was before it was made illegal. But women’s everyday athletic reality has changed.”).
107
Bartlett, supra note 105, at 4.
108
Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 24.
109
See generally Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22.
110
Buzuvis, supra note 11, at 827.
111
Brake, Feminist Legacy, supra note 14, at 457–58 (explaining that when Title IX was adopted,
opponents argued that creating opportunities for women to participate in athletics would be foolish
because women would not be interested); Horwitz, supra note 13, at 314 (noting how some groups
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supporters, however, argue that any difference between men and women
that results in lack of interest in athletics is the result of social relationships
and institutional practices that “construct” such differences.112
Accordingly, because social structures have long privileged male athletes
over females, and therefore dampened female interest in participating, a
more substantive approach to equality is necessary.113
Scholars have explained the ways that Title IX, as written and
interpreted, has accounted for this social conditioning by taking a
substantive, instead of purely formal, equality approach. This approach is
sometimes referred to as “structuralism,”114 and it maintains that to the
extent interest can adequately be measured, women’s interest historically
has been lower because of past discrimination which resulted in few
A
meaningful athletic participation opportunities for women.115
“structural” equality approach therefore does not equally weigh women’s
expressed “interest” in athletics with men’s because such “interest” might
instead be the result of social factors which discourage interest rather than
the result of real choices.116 Accordingly, advocates argue that eliminating
traditional manifestations of discrimination by creating opportunities for
women to participate in athletics will develop women’s interest in
participation.117
Title IX incorporates this substantive, or “structural” approach to
associated with men’s “minor sports” oppose the statute, arguing that girls are “not as interested in
sports as boys”).
112
Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 28–29 (“Feminists working within both relational and
anti-subordination approaches have focused on how gender difference is socially constructed. One
school of thought, particularly relevant for Title IX analysis, is loosely identified as structuralism, or
new structuralism . . . . It analyzes difference not as inherent, but as constructed through social
relationships and institutional practices.” (footnote omitted)).
113
Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 73–74; Deborah L. Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic
Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 537, 535–41 (2007) [hereinafter Brake, Pragmatic Feminism].
114
CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 64 (explaining that Title IX doctrine is “‘structuralist’ in
orientation because the courts in these cases seem to appreciate the important role that the current
structure of athletic programs and opportunities play in creating interest among students to participate
in sports”); Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 29–30 (“[A] structuralist interpretation of
discrimination law centers the legal analysis on how institutions and organizations construct sex
difference and inequality.”).
115
Horwitz, supra note 13, at 314–15.
116
Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 29 (“Structuralist approaches are reluctant to center
equality law around the equal valuation of women’s preferences when those preferences themselves
may be the products of social constraint rather than authentic choices.”).
117
Horwitz, supra note 13, at 314–15. As commentators have explained:
Any measure that purports to compare the interest of women and men in
participating in sports will be affected by the present mix of opportunities for men
and women. For example, the answers given by high school students to questions
about what college sports they want to participate in will inevitably be affected by
what sports they have had a chance to play in high school. These answers, in turn,
will have been influenced by their opportunities for college athletic scholarships and
the mix of sports offered at the college level.
Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender
Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 79 (1996).
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equality primarily through the so-called “three-part test” for compliance.
Through the three-part test, schools are required to create opportunities for
girls and women to participate in sport to stimulate females’ interest in
Title IX therefore does not require gender-blind
participating.119
assessments of athletic ability, but instead allows institutions to offer
separate male and female teams.120 More than that, Title IX has a
substantive equality element in that it does not require institutions to offer
the same sports for men and women, and Title IX grants women greater
rights to try out for a men’s team—and is much more restrictive in
allowing men to try out for a women’s team—because of the history of
discrimination against women in sports.121 As a result, Title IX has been
applauded for taking a “more comprehensive view of equality” than the
Equal Protection Clause.122
Courts frequently have endorsed the substantive, or “structural”
equality elements of Title IX.123 These cases often cite the overwhelming
statistics indicating that simply creating opportunities for women to
participate in sport has led to increased interest.124 For instance, in the
landmark case Cohen v. Brown University, the First Circuit stated that:
To assert that Title IX permits institutions to provide fewer
athletics participation opportunities for women than for men,
based upon the premise that women are less interested in
sports than are men, is . . . to ignore the fact that Title IX was
enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from
stereotyped notions of women’s interests and abilities.125
The court in Cohen went on to explain that women’s lower rate of
participation in sports was not because of an inherent lack of interest, but
was because historically, opportunities for such participation have been
limited.126 Other courts have echoed this theme.127 Thus, courts,
118

Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 49–50.
Brake, Pragmatic Feminism, supra note 113, at 537; Brake & Williams, supra note 54, at 213–
14; Buzuvis, supra note 11, at 858.
120
BRAKE, supra note 3, at 22.
121
Id. at 43.
122
Cohen, supra note 105, at 260.
123
Brake, Sex Equality, supra note 22, at 50–51; Buzuvis, supra note 11, at 825 (explaining that
the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights and courts have “recognized that social
structures, including colleges and universities, have constructed women’s interests in sports”).
124
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The
participation of girls and women in high school and college sports has increased dramatically since
Title IX was enacted. In 1971, before Congress enacted the statute, approximately 300,000 girls and
3.67 million boys played competitive high school sports nationwide. In 2002, 2.86 million girls and
3.99 million boys played competitive high school sports nationwide.”); Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164
F.3d 113, 119 n.12 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Statistics show that by 1992, in comparison to when Title IX was
enacted, the number of young women participating in sports had multiplied six times.”).
125
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 178–79 (1st Cir. 1996).
126
Id. at 178.
119
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commentators and sports administrators have emphasized that it is the
opportunity to participate in sport that drives interest, thereby turning
female athletes into the “likes” that are entitled to be treated equally with
males. Statistics have shown that this has worked to a large extent,128 as
“[t]he unprecedented growth of women’s sports in the post-Title IX years
has demonstrated the extent to which interest depends on opportunity
structures.”129
Yet despite the content of the regulations and the willingness of courts
to interpret Title IX in a way that in some respects goes beyond formal
equality, Title IX’s supporters have far too easily concluded that this
conception of gender equity in sport can continue to produce meaningful
change for women in sport. Although Title IX has important substantive
or “structural”130 equality elements, Title IX’s dominant theoretical
underpinning, and the theoretical approach that directly affects “interest” in
education-based sport, is in fact formal equality. This is because the
structuralist approach to equality admittedly does nothing to change the
model for sport offered to women.131 As will be explained below, this
127

For instance, the court in Pederson v. Louisiana State University echoed these themes, stating

that:
[LSU] argue[d] brazenly that the evidence did not demonstrate sufficient interest
and ability in fast-pitch softball at LSU . . . . The heart of this contention is that an
institution with no coach, no facilities, no varsity team, no scholarships, and no
recruiting in a given sport must have on campus enough national-caliber athletes to
field a competitive varsity team . . . before a court can find [a Title IX violation].
213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000). In Neal v. Board of Trustees of the California State
Universities, the court similarly discounted assertions that women were not as interested as
men, stating that:
[A] central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage women to participate in
sports: The increased number of roster spots and scholarships reserved for women
would gradually increase demand among women for those roster spots and
scholarships. . . .
....
Title IX has altered women’s preferences, making them more interested in sports,
and more likely to become student athletes.
198 F.3d 763, 768–69 (9th Cir. 1999). The court further explained that
[m]en’s expressed interest in participating in varsity sports is apparently higher than
women’s at the present time—although the “interest gap” continues to narrow—so
permitting gender-conscious remedies until the proportions of students and athletes
are roughly proportional gives universities more remedial freedom than permitting
remedies only until expressed interest and varsity roster spots correspond.
Id. at 767. Moreover, in testimony before Congress, one college athletic administrator stated that
“[A]fter Title IX was passed, and opportunities became available, women’s participation skyrocketed.
If we have learned anything from this experience, it is that women are interested in playing sports and
that interest expands as opportunities expand.” Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
104th Cong. 12, 204 (1995) (statement of Peggy Bradley-Doppes).
128
Brake & Catlin, supra note 117, at 82.
129
Brake, Feminist Legacy, supra note 14, at 458.
130
CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 65.
131
As Deborah Brake has explained, “[t]he different voice model of equality has made no inroads
in nudging the hyper-competitive model of sports . . . that places a higher value on broadly inclusive
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model is one that was created by and for males. Such a realization should
not be surprising. Feminist legal scholars have long recognized “[t]he
limitations of equality analysis as a transformative device,”132 because the
benchmark in an equality analysis has been the male norm.133 Nowhere is
this more apparent than in sports, a traditionally male domain. Because the
definition of discrimination adopted by Title IX is the failure to create
sufficient opportunities for women within the existing male-shaped model
for sport, the model itself was left untouched by Title IX’s equality
mandate. As a result, to enjoy the opportunities secured by Title IX,
women must still demonstrate that they are similarly situated, or the same
as, men in that they must be interested in and have the ability to be
“varsity” athletes, as that term is defined by the predominately male and
male-influenced actors that dominate our education-based sports programs.
For instance, in assessing compliance with the “effective
accommodation of student interests and abilities” prong, the Department of
Education states that the “interests and abilities” that count for purposes of
assessing compliance with Title IX are, as stated in the regulations, “the
expressed interests of students capable of intercollegiate competition134
who are members of an underrepresented sex.”135 “Interest” and “ability”
are not defined by the statute, regulations, or policy interpretations, but are
in fact defined by the institution sponsoring the athletic program, as it is
the institution that sets the goals for the program, hires coaches, and
evaluates success.
Indeed, courts explicitly defer to educational
institutions to design their own athletic programs.136 While this provision
allows for the possibility that males and females might be interested in
different sports, this provision does not presume or allow for the fact that
participation, learning new skills, cooperative teamwork, and the joy of playing.” Brake, Pragmatic
Feminism, supra note 113, at 541.
132
Finley, supra note 17, at 1148; Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 151 (1992) (“In an important sense,
then, courts will do no more than measure women’s claim to equality against legal benefits and burdens
that are an expression of white male middle-class interests and values. This means, to rephrase the
point, that women’s equality as delivered by the courts can only be an integration into a pre-existing,
predominantly male world.” (footnote omitted)).
133
Finley, supra note 17, at 1158.
134
Although the regulations and policy interpretations frequently speak of “intercollegiate”
athletics, courts have interpreted the provisions to provide guidance on interscholastic athletics as well.
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 290–91 (2d Cir. 2004).
135
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (Dec. 11, 1979).
136
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101, 112 (W.D. Va. 2007)
(noting that courts should be cautious about interfering in an educational institution’s decisions on its
athletic program offerings and that colleges and universities should be left alone “to chart their own
course in providing athletic opportunities without judicial interference or oversight”). This deference is
also seen in cases involving the remedy to be fashioned for a Title IX violation. See Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 187–88 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Our respect for academic freedom and reluctance to
interject ourselves into the conduct of university affairs counsels that we give universities as much
freedom as possible in conducting their operations consonant with constitutional and statutory limits.”).
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male and female athletes might have different interests and abilities with
respect to the model of sport offered. Accordingly, the regulations, policy
interpretations, and clarifications make clear that to be entitled to equal
treatment, benefits, and opportunities, prospective female athletes must
meet the standard for “varsity” competition that is defined by the
institution.137
The formal equality nature of Title IX therefore is evident in that
regardless of what sport women play, whether it is the same or different
from men, they must be interested in and play at the “varsity” level as
constructed by the institution. Accordingly, while Title IX does not allow
schools to assume that women are not as interested in sports as men, and
requires schools to create opportunities for women, it does allow schools to
assume that the only athletes entitled to equal treatment are those who
assimilate into the male model for sport that dominates education-based
athletics. As a result, allowing institutions to provide sex-segregated teams
is not as far beyond formal equality as one might think, because those
separate women’s teams functionally are not different from men’s sports.
That is, if women athletes expressed an interest and had the ability to
engage in varsity athletics for the sake of social connection and health
benefits, and were not as concerned with winning or commercial appeal
(and they were not capable of performing at the high levels sought by
coaches and athletic administrators), they would not be entitled to a place
on the team. In addition, sex segregation of teams, while in some respects
valuing women athletes for their own abilities, serves to preserve the male
norm as the standard for athletic excellence.
Thus, the assertion that Title IX’s formal equality dimension
overshadows its substantive or “structural” equality features is not just an
academic exercise. The content of gender equity in sport is not defined by
the statute or regulations, but is given meaning by the institutions which
determine whether an athlete is “interested” and has the “ability” to
participate. The content of such equality therefore is directly tied to what
women might be interested in when contemplating participation, or
continued participation, in sport. In this way, Title IX’s conception of
equality, which has shown such promise in opening up sports to women, is
now showing its limit. This is because a conception of equality that
requires assimilation ultimately will fall short of achieving true gender
equity in sport because it relies on evaluating prospective female athletes
according to a standard that was long defined by males.138 Accordingly, as
137
VARGYAS, supra note 37, at 15 (explaining that the focus of Title IX is intercollegiate
opportunities).
138
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 119
(1987) (“Radical feminism is not satisfied with women emulating the existing image of the athlete,
which has been a male image.”).

2010]

NOT JUST ONE OF THE BOYS

427

feminist scholars discovered in other contexts, “[equality theory] works
well and should continue to be the guide when the goal is assimilation of
women into male institutions. Assimilation, however, too often means the
creation of ‘a world in which persons of both genders are encouraged to act
as men currently do . . . .’”139 This has made impossible any debate about
the model for sport offered in our educational institutions or how a model
which takes into account women’s interests and priorities might be
different. More than that, the equality approach taken by Title IX has
reinforced the current model—reaffirming the fact that the motivations for
sport participation and attributes displayed by the male student-athlete are
the norm.
B. The Male Norm for Sport
It may be that the theoretical limits of the formal equality analysis are
not problematic in the Title IX context because women might simply be
“interested” in assimilating into the male model for sport. Certainly, this is
true for many if not most of the women who have taken advantage of Title
IX’s opportunities. For this sub-set of women, the hybrid equality
approach of Title IX, focusing on creating opportunities in the existing
sports framework, is sufficient to create interest. However, for the large
subset of women who do not participate in sport, or do not continue their
participation, it is important to examine how the model for sport within
which Title IX’s equality mandate operates can affect interest in
participating. Such an examination reveals that by deferring to institutions
to define the content of intercollegiate or interscholastic “varsity” athletics,
Title IX incorporates a model for sport that was constructed by males for
the purpose of developing socially-constructed characteristics of
masculinity.140
To begin, the Title IX regulations, policy interpretations, and
clarifications make clear that to be entitled to equal treatment, benefits and
opportunities, prospective female athletes must be the same as men and be
able to engage in the level of competition that the institution defines as
“varsity.”141 For instance, compliance in terms of levels of competition
139
Finley, supra note 17, at 1142; see also MACKINNON, supra note 138, at 118 (“Liberal
feminist strategies for change correspond to its critique: ignore or eliminate irrational differences. To
the extent that differentiation is irrational, assimilation or integration is recommended. Those things
that men have been, psychologically and physically, so also women should be allowed to become.”).
140
Some scholars would argue as well that the current institution of sport was constructed to
perpetuate and reinforce men’s power over women. MACKINNON, supra note 138, at 117–20.
141
Thus, to assess compliance with the “effective accommodation of interests and abilities”
prong, the Department of Education will examine: the determination of athletic interests and abilities of
students, the selection of sports offered, and the levels of competition available, including the
opportunity for team competition. The “interests and abilities” that count for purposes of assessing
compliance with Title IX are, as stated in the regulations, “the expressed interests of students capable
of intercollegiate competition.” Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy
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offered is assessed by determining whether men’s and women’s teams
have “equivalently advanced competitive opportunities” or whether the
institution has a practice of upgrading the competitive opportunities
available to women athletes to meet the developing abilities.142 Moreover,
in a 2008 clarification letter, the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights stated that in determining which activities can be counted as
interscholastic or intercollegiate sports, OCR will consider, essentially,
whether the activity resembles currently-existing varsity sports.143
Moreover, in attempting to meet prong two of the three-part test, an
institution’s compliance is measured by adding and upgrading teams to
varsity status.144 In addition, in describing compliance with the third prong
of the three-part test, OCR has stated that an institution is deemed to be
fully and effectively accommodating its underrepresented students’
athletics interests and abilities unless there is a sport(s) that meets the
following conditions: “(1) unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity
team in the sport(s); (2) sufficient ability to sustain an intercollegiate team
in the sport(s); and (3) reasonable expectation of intercollegiate
competition for a team in the sport(s) within the school’s normal
competitive region.”145
To determine compliance, OCR looks at the “concrete and viable”
interests of the underrepresented sex, with the focus on whether there
exists interest in varsity athletics competition and the ability to sustain a
team with a reasonable expectation of competition in the school’s usual
competitive region.146 OCR’s regulations on measuring interest and ability
provide that in assessing students’ interests and abilities, institutions must
use methods that will measure interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team.
Assessments by athletic directors and coaches regarding ability to perform
Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (Dec. 11, 1979); see
also VARGYAS, supra note 37, at 15 (indicating the need for Title IX to address discrimination in
intercollegiate level athletic programs).
142
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
143
Dear Colleague Letter, Athletic Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance, Stephanie
Monroe,
Assistant
Sec’y
for
Civil
Rights
(Sept.
17,
2008),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20080917.html.
144
Dear Colleague Letter, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The ThreePart Test, Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights (Jan. 16, 1996), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html.
145
Dear Colleague Letter, United States Dep’t of Educ. Office of Civil Rights, Additional
Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test—Part Three (Mar. 17, 2005)
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter, Mar. 17, 2005], available at http://www.nacua.org/
documents/AdditionalClarificationThreePartTest_2005.pdf. According to OCR, from 1992–2002,
about two-thirds of the 130 schools that were investigated for Title IX violations came into compliance
with the statute through part three of the test. Id. On April 20, 2010 the OCR withdrew the Dear
Colleague Letter. See Dear Colleague Letter, United States Dep’t of Educ. Office of Civil Rights (Apr.
20, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20100420.pdf.
146
Dear Colleague Letter, Mar. 17, 2005.
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at the varsity level will be “presumed valid.”
The ways in which OCR
determines whether there is sufficient ability include students’ athletic
experience and achievement, students’ self-assessment of his or her ability
to compete at the varsity level, and the opinions of coaches and
administrators.148 OCR has noted that “[a]lthough a student’s experience
in a particular sport may be a good indicator of ability, it does not
necessarily reflect the student’s ability to compete on a team at the higher
level required of intercollegiate athletes.”149 In contrast, a student’s
assessment of lack of ability to compete at the varsity level is presumed to
be evidence of lack of ability.150
Understanding that Title IX requires assimilation into the institution’s
construction of the “varsity” model for sport then begs the inevitable
question: what is “varsity” sport? Given what we know about the role of
sport generally in shaping the male identity, it is clear that “varsity” level
athletics is not an objective standard, but a social construct—one created
by and for men.
1. Sport and Masculinization
Feminist scholars have asserted that “all social constructs . . . are
products of a patriarchal society.”151 More specifically, feminist scholars
have asserted that sport is “a patriarchal institution that reinforces men’s
power over women.”152 Sport, however, is most widely held to be an
institution that is important in developing men’s gender identity and
establishing hierarchies between men,153 as it is “a social institution
constructed by men.”154 Sport has long been thought of as a forum “for the
development of masculine behaviors . . . [and is] one of the most important
sites of masculinising practice and socializ[ing] boys into many of the
values, attitudes, and skills considered so important in the adult world of
men.”155 As a result, masculinity and athletics are often seen as one and
the same, especially in the educational context,156 as education-based sport
147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Cain, supra note 78, at 808.
152
MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY: SPORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF MASCULINITY 17
(1992); see also MACKINNON, supra note 138, at 117–20 (describing how athletics have been designed
“to maximize attributes that are identical with what the male sex role values in men”).
153
MESSNER, supra note 152, at 19.
154
Id. at 16; MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 12, 19 (2005). “Sport has long been perceived as a masculine domain and is one of the
primary sites for the social construction of masculinity in contemporary Western society.” Murray J.N.
Drummond, Sport and Images of Masculinity: The Meaning of Relationships in the Life Course of
“Elite” Male Athletes, 10 J. MEN’S STUD. 129, 129 (2002).
155
Drummond, supra note 154, at 131.
156
David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth of
Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 161–62 (2009).
148
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defines “a pattern of aggressive and dominating performance as the most
admired form of masculinity.”157 Thus, athletic competition demonstrates
that men’s bodies can “sustain physical punishment and engage in violence
in ways that [make] them superior to women’s bodies,”158 so that scholars
have explained that the institution of sport establishes and “perpetuate[s]
the notions of male dominance at the expense of women.”159 Therefore,
scholars have explained that “[i]n a society where winning is generally
afforded the privilege of perceived dominance, sport offers its male
participants a number of incentives.”160 As Catharine MacKinnon
explained, “most athletics, particularly the most lucrative of them, have
been internally designed to maximize attributes that are identical with what
the male sex role values in men.”161
In addition to understanding that the current model was shaped by and
for males, it is important to further deconstruct the normative content of
varsity athletics to determine what women who might take up sport might
be interested in and must be able to do. In this regard, a review of the
social construction of youth sport can provide assistance in determining
what women and girls would be interested in as they set out to claim what
Title IX has promised them. Social science data and popular media
accounts illustrate that today’s student-athlete quite likely has her interest
in sport and ability shaped through the social construction of sport that
encourages early specialization and over-training, commercial appeal, and
elite athlete status—a model built by and for masculinizing males.162
2. Early Specialization and Overtraining
One fact of intercollegiate and, increasingly, interscholastic sports is
that there are finite opportunities. That is, educational institutions do not
have unlimited budgets for athletic programs, which are, at best, an
extension of the educational mission of the institution. As a result, there is
a natural scarcity which creates a competitive situation for those athletes
who hope to claim a position on an institution’s sports team. The
prevailing perception among parents, coaches, and the media is that a child
is best positioned to claim such a scarce position on a high school and,
most importantly, college or university team if he or she starts participating

157
Id. at 161. “[O]rganized, competitive sports were perceived as being sites in which boys were
taught to be tough while creating men who fit dominant forms of masculinity.” Drummond, supra note
154, at 131. “Organized team sports in particular have often been revered as a central site for the
construction of masculinity.” Id. at 132.
158
Id. at 131 (citation omitted).
159
Id. at 136.
160
Id.
161
MACKINNON, supra note 138, at 120.
162
Id. at 117–20.
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163

in competitive sports at an early age, specializes in sport at an early age,
and trains year-round. Title IX scholars have noted as much, observing
that there is an “increasingly competitive environment for women’s
intercollegiate sports where there are very few opportunities for female
college athletes to ‘walk on’”164 to a sports team. This competitive
environment means that, as a practical matter, “[i]t takes years and years of
competitive play to have the necessary skill to take advantage of the sports
opportunities Title IX has created at the college level.”165 Accordingly, the
hope for a college scholarship, or even a professional career, can motivate
athletes and their parents to commit to specialized sports training regimens
at an early age. Such programs often could be considered extreme even for
adults.166 To gain the years of competitive play necessary to be a studentathlete, children interested in sports, with the support of their parents,
participate in organized sports programs.167 While organized sports
programs can have significant physical and social benefits, the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), among other groups, has warned that
“[o]rganization of sports . . . can . . . create demands and expectations that
exceed the readiness and capabilities of young participants.”168 Indeed, the
AAP article notes that “in organized sports, inappropriate or overzealous
parental or adult influences can have negative effects.”169 “Unfortunately,
when demands and expectations of the sport exceed the maturation or
readiness of the participant, benefits of participation are offset. The shift
from child-oriented goals to adult-oriented goals can further negate
positive aspects of organized sports.”170 One of the negative aspects is
early specialization and overtraining, with numerous reports of girls in
163

James White & Gerald Masterson, Problems in Youth Sports, FAMILYRESOURCE.COM,
www.familyresource.com/parenting/sports/problems-in-youth-sports (last visited Oct. 12, 2010)
(“Starting ages for youth in competitive sports have lowered dramatically in the past two decades.” An
estimated “40 million children are involved in competitive sports. It’s not just the numbers that are
staggering, but the manner in which kids are playing.”).
164
Brake & Williams, supra note 54, at 201.
165
Id.
166
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Intensive Training, supra note 74, at 154; see also Bob Condor,
Pushing the Limits: Exploring Just How Much is Too Much in Youth Sports, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Sept. 27, 2004, at F1 (emphasizing that young athletes sometimes “push too hard”);
Andrew Ferguson et al., Inside the Crazy Culture of Kids Sports, TIME (July 12, 1999), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991464,00.html
(explaining
the
rise
in
expectations); Steven W. Gray, Sport Specialization by Children, TOWNSHIP LACROSSE (June 16,
2009) available at http://www.townshiplacrosse.com/uploads/Sport_Specialization.pdf (“A main
reason for the rise in sport specialization by children athletes is the increasing commercialization of
sport.”); Detavius Mason, Age of Specialization: One Sport vs. Multisports, GUILFORD ORTHOPEDIC
AND SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER (last visited Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.guilfordortho.com/
age_of_specialization.htm (explaining the result of physical and psychological burnouts).
167
Specifically, children who have the social-economic means to pursue youth sports.
168
Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Sports Med. & Fitness & Comm. on Sch. Health,
Organized Sports for Children and Preadolescents, 107 PEDIATRICS 1459, 1459 (2001).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1461.
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sports like basketball and soccer training year-round, and suffering the
injuries that come from such a schedule.171 One youth sports organization
has summed up the problems by explaining that “[o]ne of the biggest
issues in youth sports today is the professionalization of children’s
sports . . . . Examples of this professional model include adults pressuring
kids to win at early ages, along with single-sports specialization and yearround training . . . .”172
Sport specialization is defined as “athletes limiting their athletic
participation to one sport which is practiced, trained for, and competed in
throughout the year.”173 Social scientists have long discussed the
“alarming trend” of specialization, which has been described as “simply
inconsistent with a high school’s educational goals and objectives.”174
While high school coaches and administrators are charged with providing a
sound athletic program to augment educational goals, they are also
expected to field teams that win.175 Specialization is believed to increase
an athlete’s chances of success and therefore is believed to benefit athletic
programs. Studies have shown that high school coaches frequently are a
source of pressure on athletes to specialize, as these coaches believe it will
raise the athletes’ skill level and benefit the program.176 It is also believed
that specialization will make the athlete competitive for a college
scholarship.177
171
See Jack Kelly, A World of Hurt; More Girls Playing Sports Means More Injuries, Especially
in the Knees, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 28, 2008, at C-8 (“Girls are specializing in a sport
much younger than they have been in the past . . . . Constant pressure to perform is putting them at
greater risk” for injury.); B.J. Koubaroulis, Scholarships with a Cost: Soccer Standouts Play YearRound at Frenetic Pace, WASH. POST, May 21, 2009, at D01 (“[P]ressures from parents, coaches and
other athletes often cause players to over-indulge during such a critical developmental stage.”).
172
Press Release, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Alliance Issues ‘Poor Grades’ on National
Youth Sports Report Card (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/Media+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Release+Archive
/2005/Announcements/Alliance+Issues+Poor+Grades+on+National+Youth+Sports+Report+Card.
173
Jay Watts, Perspectives on Sport Specialization, J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE,
Oct. 2002, at 33, 33.
174
Id.
175
David Susanj & Craig Stewart, Specialization in Sport: How Early . . . How Necessary?,
COACHESINFO, http://www.coachesinfo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=303:
specialization&catid=91:general-articles&Itemid=170 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
176
Id. (“Many believe to earn athletic scholarships and consistently have winning programs,
athletes must spend significant time outside the regular season working on sport-specific skills. The
perception of most coaches and parents is that if all the other athletes are doing it and you aren’t, in
time, you won’t be able to compete.” (citation omitted)).
177
Watts, supra note 173, at 33−34. Nevertheless, social scientists have noted that “although . . .
specialization enhances individual and team performance, it undermines the basic purpose of high
school athletics.” Susanj & Stewart, supra note 175. Indeed, while it is generally accepted that sports
participation is a beneficial activity, there are “numerous negative effects” from sport specialization.
Critics point out that specialization “conflicts with the educational mission of schools whose goals
should be to provide athletic programs that lead to the greatest personal growth for the greatest number
of students.” Id. It has also been suggested that specialization leads to burnout, as the pressure to
succeed as well as failure or injuries can be “devastating” to a sport specialist. Sports specialization
can also lead to overuse injuries. Moreover, it is not clear that sport specialization can help an athlete
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3. Commercialization and Emphasis on Winning over Academics.
Another aspect of the varsity sport model is the structure of sport that
emphasizes winning over participation. Winning has taken center-stage in
the model for high school and college sports because winning sports
programs provide spectator interest and commercial appeal. As explained
by one observer, “[h]igh school and college programs have concentrated
the vast majority of their resources on sports for which there is
considerable public interest and the prospect of professional sports
opportunities.”178 This has led to the well-known, now familiar issue of
playing-to-win subverting academic pursuits in the lives of studentathletes. As one media outlet characterized it, “[s]chools admit athletes
with dismal academic records, then spend millions to keep them eligible . .
. . Even so, graduation records are an embarrassment at some schools . . . .
And academic fraud continues to plague major programs . . . .”179 This
familiar assessment now applies to some women’s sports as well, with
reports that women’s basketball players are having “widespread” problems
with academics.180 The emphasis on athletics over academics is reinforced
by the fact that athletic scholarships are only for one year. Thus, athletic
performance matters, and students who want to keep their scholarships

become better at her sport. Id. (“The pressure to succeed in sports often leads to burnout and
dropout . . . . The one-dimensional self-concept that develops with specialized athletes creates a
developmental dead end. Young athletes feel trapped in a role and identity that depends on their
success as an athlete.”); Watts, supra note 173, at 35 (“Burnout begins when the perceived, stressinduced costs of participating in a sport outweigh the rewards of participation.”).
178
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce
& Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 104th Cong. 187 (1995) (statement of
Donna A. Lopiano, Exec. Dir., Women’s Sports Found.).
179
Gilbert M. Gaul & Frank Fitzpatrick, Rise of the Athletic Empires: At Schools Such as Penn
State, Corporate Sponsors and Boosters Fund an Athletic Juggernaut, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 10,
2000, at A01; see also Timothy Davis, Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University’s Educational
Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 753, 756−57 (1991) (“An unjustifiably high
number of student-athletes leave institutions of higher education without degrees.” This is “not
surprising because [schools] often admit student-athletes with low academic predictors and then fail to
provide . . . support services . . . .” Additionally, student-athletes are “often encouraged and counseled
to take courses that will enable them to maintain their athletic eligibility, even though such courses will
not provide them with substantive educational benefits.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher M. Parent,
Forward Progress? An Analysis of Whether Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 226, 256 (2004) (arguing for some sort of compensation for collegiate athletes); Orion Riggs, The
Façade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 5 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 137, 141
(1996) (explaining the hypocrisy of the NCAA encouraging athletics as a part of education when many
student-athletes are unprepared for the rigors of the schools they attend and were often admitted only
after the school lowered its academic standards for the athlete); Jill Lieber Steeg et al., Athletes Guided
Toward ‘Beating the System’; New NCAA Rules Lead to Clusters in Certain Majors, USA TODAY,
Nov. 19, 2008, at 1A.
180
Ian Begley & Mitch Abramson, Girls Game Gone Wild: Increased Opportunity on Court
Brings Familiar Pitfalls Off of It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 26, 2008, at 6 (quoting one player as stating
that “[i]n high school it was hard to balance school work with basketball. . . . We’d practice until nine
at night, and then I’d come home and I was too tired to study. I was exhausted. I was trying to do my
homework while I was in school the next day. It didn’t work.”).
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must make sports their main focus.
The problem of commercialization
and athletics over academics has continued to grow to the point that one
former college president stated that “[w]e’re in show business . . . . We’re
not providing opportunities for students. If we were really in the business
of providing opportunities for students, we’d be investing in intramural
athletics. That’s for students.”182
Title IX does nothing to change this phenomenon, and in fact even
reinforces it. Because Title IX serves to ensure that girls will not be denied
the same opportunity for commercialized athletics participation as men, the
regulations state that a school cannot “limit the potential for women’s
athletic events to rise in spectator appeal.”183 That spectator appeal is an
important part of athletics (and considered a measurement for whether an
athlete’s participation has been a success) is reflected in the cases. For
instance, one court in a decision upholding Title IX explained that: “This
past summer, 90,185 enthusiastic fans crowded into Pasadena’s historic
Rose Bowl for the finals of the Women’s World Cup soccer match. . . .
The victory sparked a national celebration and a realization by many that
women’s sports could be just as exciting, competitive, and lucrative as
men’s sports.”184 Whether an individual’s sport participation is exciting to
watch and lucrative is thus incorporated, almost unconsciously, into Title
IX as a justification for providing equal participation opportunity. As
some scholars have said, “[i]n a commercialized model of sports, in which
winning is valued above the experience of the game, athletes are
essentially commodities, useful only to the extent they advance the goal of
winning.”185
4. Elite-Level Ability
Intercollegiate and interscholastic varsity sport is also characterized by
the fact that those who participate must usually have elite-level ability.
Deborah Brake has explained that Title IX implicitly incorporates the
model of “elite competitive sports as the baseline measure of equality.”186
Accordingly, while courts have noted that “[n]othing in Title IX requires
181
Allen L. Sack, Big-Time Athletics vs. Academic Values: It’s a Rout, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 26, 2001, at B7.
182
Ian Herbert, Selling Their Soles: The Commercialization of College Sports, MICH. DAILY
(Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/selling-their-soles-commercialization-collegesports?page=0,1. Indeed, as one Title IX scholar has noted, “nothing about sports as played in today’s
educational institutions is ‘natural’—not even what counts as a ‘sport.’ The popularity and revenueproducing potential of a sport is certainly not natural; it is carefully promoted and nurtured by the
machinery of college (and professional) athletics.” Brake, Feminist Legacy, supra note 14, at 481.
183
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979).
184
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999).
185
Brake & Williams, supra note 54, at 235.
186
Brake, Pragmatic Feminism, supra note 113, at 541−42 (explaining that the elite model of
sports is “dominant”).
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an institution to create a ‘top flight’ varsity team,” the converse is also
true: there is nothing in Title IX which prevents a school from creating and
striving for “top-flight” status. Given the external pressures that reward
only winning programs, it is no surprise that most education-based sport
programs seek to develop, and strive to maintain, “top-flight” programs.188
Thus, for instance, in Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois, the court noted that the University of Illinois athletic department’s
goal was to “field only teams ‘capable of competing for championships in
the Big Ten Conference.’”189 It is in this way that Title IX incorporates the
prevailing norms about what it means to be a student-athlete and
participate in education-based sports programs.190 Colleges are spending
ever-increasing funds to recruit elite athletes, including female athletes, for
their athletic programs.191 As noted in the Chronicle of Higher Education,
recruitment spending has doubled or tripled as athletics departments seek
187
Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 835 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the
district court exceeded its authority in ordering the university to play an exhibition season as well as
field a women’s softball team during the regular season, so that the team would be more competitive).
188
See Robert C. Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 993, 998 (1995) (“For
football, an overemphasis on winning and profits has produced a game that often appears to be very far
removed from the educational function of the university.”); Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A.
McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 495, 520 (2008) (describing the increase in spending in budgets for Division I athletic programs);
Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense
in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 43−46 (2000) (arguing that collegiate
athletes should be compensated for their work based on the exorbitant amount of money schools make
off football and basketball, the extreme salaries of coaches, the sponsorship deals schools make for
uniforms, and the “world-class facilities” schools build to entice players to join their programs); Karan
Arakotaram, College Sports’ Warped Finances, YALE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/25469 (noting that the highest paid state government
employee in Texas is the UT football coach, who gets a bonus if his team reaches a fifty percent
graduation rate—the prior season the graduation rate was just forty-two percent—and arguing for a
adjustment to that system); Gaul & Fitzpatrick, supra note 179, at A01 (“Games have become
marketing tools to promote the college brand and gain national acclaim. Entertaining alumni and
boosters has become more important than encouraging enjoyment and participation among students and
athletes—the original idea behind college sports.”); Making Money Off High School Kids? Texas Prep
Football Squad a Cash Machine, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/preps/football/2006-09-13-southlake-carroll_x.htm (explaining the
result of “priceless publicity”); Julie Sabatier, Corporate Money in School Sports Favors Boys, May
Violate Law, NEW STANDARD, (June 26, 2006), http://www.commercialexploitation.org/
news/corporatemoneyfavorsboys.htm (explaining that “companies like Nike . . . began looking for
outstanding players to sponsor at the high school level in the mid-1990s”).
189
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994).
190
The regulations and Policy Interpretation make clear that varsity, competitive athletic
opportunities is the focus of Title IX. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. That is, although the
regulations mention “club” and “intramural” as falling within the purview of the equality mandate,
these opportunities in no way substitute for varsity opportunities and, in fact, because there is still not,
at most institutions, equality between men’s varsity opportunities and those for women, any club or
intramural opportunity provided for women’s sports would be eyed for elevation to varsity status. Of
course, because of the commercial potential of varsity sport, it is the preferred model of sport offered in
the intercollegiate setting.
191
Libby Sander, Have Money, Will Travel: The Quest for Top Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 1, 2008, at 1.
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to pursue “elite athletes” on a “national . . . scope.”
Title IX cases
involving scheduling of high school sports reflect this trend, with girls
successfully arguing that scheduling their sport in an “off season” or “nontraditional” season amounts to discrimination because the scheduling of
sports can affect girls’ visibility and access to college recruiters, a benefit
that boys’ teams have long enjoyed.193 Indeed, one of the hoped-for effects
of Title IX, as expressed in Congress, was that it would help increase our
supply of female Olympians.194
Many Title IX cases reflect the social construction that a studentathlete is one who has specialized training, can contribute to an athletic
program that cultivates commercial appeal, and has developed elite ability.
For instance, in McCormick v. School District of Mamaroneck, a group of
female athletes challenged the scheduling of soccer in the spring for girls,
while it was scheduled in the fall for boys.195 The court held that the
players demonstrated that they were irreparably harmed by being forced to
play in the spring season, which necessarily meant that they could not
compete for the state championship.196
Notably, the court highlighted the fact that the plaintiffs were part of
the Olympic Development program for “girls with exceptional ability in
soccer.”197 The court explained in detail how the boys who were involved
in the Olympic Development Program did not have the same issues as the
girls, because the program was scheduled for the spring.198 Since the girls’
high school soccer program was scheduled for the spring, however, they
faced a conflict. It was also noted that the girls participated on elite “club”
soccer teams and that the scheduling presented by spring, instead of fall,
soccer made competing on both teams difficult.199 In addition, playing
soccer in the spring, it was alleged, disadvantaged the girls in terms of
college recruiting, because many coaches do recruiting at club games in the
spring. Girls who are playing both for their club and their high school
team in the spring are therefore “not at their best” because they have not
192

Id.
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 302 (2d Cir. 2004); Cmtys. for Equity
v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 836–38 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
194
As stated by Norma Cantú, former Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at the Department of
Education:
Senator Hatch has perhaps best captured the essence of the meaning and promise
of Title IX. In 1984, on the Senate floor, he observed that there were few, if any,
Senators who did not want “Title IX implemented so as to continue to encourage
women throughout America to develop into Olympic athletes . . . .”
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce &
Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 104th Cong. 12 (1995) (statement of Norma V.
Cantú, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.).
195
McCormick, 370 F.3d at 279.
196
Id. at 302.
197
Id. at 281.
198
Id. at 280.
199
Id. at 281.
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been able to practice as much with their club team, they are injured from
“playing too much soccer” and, at that point in the year, “many are burned
out.”200 Also of note is that in McCormick, the school district argued that
the plaintiffs’ claim reflected an unhealthy “single mindedness” with
respect to soccer. The court rejected this argument, stating that the
students’ level of commitment to their sport was “not relevant.”201 The
court did, however, praise the athletes, stating that “many would include
‘single mindedness’ in a list of those traits possessed by great athletes.
Few would choose the trait well-rounded.”202
Similarly, in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, the plaintiffs were
challenging the university’s decision to eliminate its varsity volleyball
team.203 The court explained in great detail who, in terms of ability, the
affected athletes were, starting with the recruitment process for
intercollegiate volleyball, noting that “[t]he recruiting process for Division
I volleyball can begin as early as a player’s sophomore year in high
school.”204 In order to eventually be recruited, the athletes testified that
they “began playing volleyball on a competitive basis in fourth or fifth
grade. In addition to playing volleyball for their high school teams, those
recruited plaintiffs played for club teams during the off-season, traveling to
interstate competitions on the weekends and thereby maintaining a yearround commitment to volleyball.”205 Moreover, the plaintiffs testified that
they chose Quinnipiac because they felt a “bond” with the team, which was
crucial because “playing Division I volleyball is a time-intensive activity,
akin to a ‘full-time job.’ Given the number of hours spent practicing,
playing, and traveling with the team,” the court noted that their relationship
with the coach and each other was important.206 The court ultimately
entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the university from
eliminating the volleyball team, noting that the plaintiffs would suffer
irreparable harm because of
the loss . . . even a year of competition would have on the
skills and competitiveness of elite Division I athletes such as
the student plaintiffs in this case.
The plaintiffs in this case have devoted a significant
portion of their lives to training for the opportunity to
200

Id. at 282.
Id. at 296.
202
Id. None of this is to suggest that the school district was treating the male and female athletes
in the school district equally by scheduling women’s soccer, but not men’s, in a season where the
women could not compete for the state championship. The court’s discussion, however, powerfully
illuminates the underlying norms of sport participation that exist in education-based sport programs.
203
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 278 (D. Conn. 2009).
204
Id. at 282.
205
Id.
206
Id.
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compete on a Division I volleyball team in college, spending
countless hours competing on high school and club teams and
participating in the rigorous and time-consuming recruiting
process . . . .
. . . As explained above, losing a year of competition would
cause unquantifiable harm to their elite volleyball training
and skill development.207
The dominance of the elite model of sport is also seen in cases and
commentary celebrating Title IX for this very fact. For instance, part of
the Title IX narrative has long been the recitation of the number and
success of elite female athletes on the Olympic and World Championship
level. For example, the court in Cohen v. Brown University stated that:
One need look no further than the impressive
performances of our country’s women athletes in the 1996
Olympic Summer Games to see that Title IX has had a
dramatic and positive impact on the capabilities of our
women athletes, particularly in team sports. These
Olympians represent the first full generation of women to
grow up under the aegis of Title IX. The unprecedented
success of these athletes is due, in no small measure, to
Title IX’s beneficent effects on women’s sports . . . .
What stimulated this remarkable change in the quality of
women’s athletic competition was not a sudden,
anomalous upsurge in women’s interest in sports, but the
enforcement of Title IX . . . .208
It is therefore apparent that courts have served to reinforce the message
that Title IX opportunities reflect the prevailing norm that education-based
sport is for elite athletes whose focus is on winning, as it appears above
question that, in the words of the Second Circuit, “[a] primary purpose of
competitive athletics is to strive to be the best.”209
Thus, although the regulations implementing Title IX have been
interpreted to require schools to create opportunities to stimulate demand,
the opportunities created are based on the male norm, operated through the
“varsity” model for sport.
That is, Title IX’s regulations and
interpretations provide nothing more than a chance for female athletes to
assimilate, not define the way in which they will participate in sport. The
notion that sex-segregated teams and a different selection of sports for
207

Id. at 292.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
209
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2004).
208
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males and females gives women a meaningful voice in the structure and
type of opportunities offered through Title IX overlooks the fact of the
male norm as defining the standard for education-based sport. This is
because although the selection of sports may be different, the way in which
they are played, with the expectations of the socially constructed “varsity
athlete,” reflecting characteristically male values and expectations, remains
the same. Accordingly, a female athlete must functionally be the same as a
male athlete. Moreover, to be the same as a male athlete, a female athlete
must be interested in and have the ability to participate in a model of sport
that is uniquely male—historically shaped by male coaches and athletic
administrators and reflecting what are considered to be male characteristics
and values.210
In sum, under Title IX, prospective female student athletes necessarily
have to be “interested” in and have the “ability” to participate in the model
of varsity sport long played by male athletes and favored by educational
institutions.211 Although some commentators have noted that Title IX and
the implementing regulations accommodate gender differences by allowing
schools to sex segregate teams and offer a different selection of sports for
male and female athletes,212 this does not offer as much accommodation of
difference as might be assumed. A school could offer a very different mix
of sports for men and women, with the goal that all teams, regardless of
gender, perform at a certain level or be competitive for championships.
Thus, the difference being accommodated is really only in taste in sports,
but not how those sports are played. As explained below, this has a
significant impact on women’s and girls’ interest in sport.
C. The Interest Paradox
Title IX in many ways is a product of its time. In the early 1970s,
when Title IX was passed and its implementing regulations promulgated,
feminist scholars were securing victories for women in various areas of life
through the use of a formal equality approach, arguing that in all relevant
respects, women were the “same” as men.213 This “sameness” approach is
apparent throughout the regulations which are the heart of Title IX. Yet
the recognition that Title IX relies upon a conception of equality that
requires assimilation into a model for sport that was constructed by males,
for the purpose of masculinizing men, sheds new light on the ability of
210

MESSNER, supra note 152, at 13–17.
VARGYAS, supra note 37, at 53 (explaining that although Title IX prohibits discrimination in
intramural and club (non-varsity) athletics, the emphasis is on varsity athletics).
212
Id.
213
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 1497–98 (“[E]arly feminist work, including both litigation
and the legal theories that supported it were based on claiming equality through the attributes of
‘sameness’—men and women are the same and should have equal rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Title IX to stimulate women’s interest in sport. Seen in this way, the
“Field of Dreams” narrative shows its limits, because it rests on two faulty
premises: first, that there exists a neutral, non-gendered model of “sport” in
our educational institutions that equally could attract male and female
participants, and second, that all women want the same sport experience.
Given this, the question for Title IX today is not whether women are
inherently interested in a so-called objective experience called “sport,” but
instead whether women are interested in assimilating into a model for sport
constructed by and for men.
It is recognized by both Title IX’s critics and supporters that
substantial numbers of women are in fact not so interested. However, the
structural theory of equality, which explains lagging participation rates as
discriminatory social conditioning and not the product of authentic choice,
produces a paradoxical effect. Such a theory discounts women’s choices to
opt out of sport and argues for creating more opportunities for women to
participate in a model for sport that does not resonate with them. It is a
Catch-22: instead of developing interest in sport participation, Title IX is
producing an “interest paradox,” dampening interest in sports participation
in the very population the statute and regulations are meant to reach.
Therefore, if Title IX is, as courts and legal commentators suggest, meant
to develop and encourage women’s participation in athletics,214 it is not
fully succeeding.
This interest paradox, of course, does not apply to all women. It is
apparent that there are some women who are interested in assimilating into
the male-constructed model for sport. Title IX’s participation statistics,
showing steady increases since the statute and regulations were
implemented, tell the story of these women well. There are, however, two
other groups of women, represented in the statistics which repeatedly show
large numbers of girls and women not participating, with whom we should
be concerned. The first are those who try to assimilate into the maleconstructed, “varsity” model for sport but fall victim to one of its common
outcomes, known as “burnout.” The second group of girls and women are
those who do not participate at all, getting the message from Title IX that if
they are not willing to submit to the prevailing sport culture, they should
stay on the sidelines.
The first group of women, those who try to assimilate into the
“varsity” model, have their stories told through statistics on sport
“burnout.” “Burnout” is not a natural, inevitable result of sport training,
but is a phenomenon associated with the male-constructed, “varsity” sport

214
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] central
aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage women to participate in sports . . . .”).
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model predominating in American educational institutions. “Burnout” is
defined as “the athlete’s natural response to chronic, ongoing stress.”216
According to researchers, burnout starts to manifest at age thirteen, with
children quitting sports they had long enjoyed.217 The effects of burnout
can be long term, with individuals often permanently leaving all organized
sports activity.218 Youth sports groups report that between twenty and
forty million children per year sign up for competitive sports.219 The data,
however, also show that seventy percent of these children quit playing
competitive sports by age thirteen, and do not play again. An executive
with the National Youth Sports Coaches’ Association states that “[t]he
number one reason (why they quit) is that it stopped being fun,”220 because,
as commentator Carleton Kendrick states, “‘fun’ takes a back seat to
winning.”221 A sizeable literature on youth sports shows that it is at this
age that the effects of being an “athlete” set in, leading the child to reject
participation in any sport.222
Thus, even for those who wish to assimilate, Title IX may have
extinguished interest in sport by reinforcing male norms about sport
215
Niesha Lofing, Kids, Sports, Stress: Watch for Overtraining and Burnout, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 20, 2009, at D3.
216
White & Masterson, supra note 163.
217
Id.
218
Jacqueline Stenson, Pushing Too Hard Too Young, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 29, 2004, 11:23 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4556235 (“Not only are these youngsters at risk for emotional burnout,
they may also develop injuries that plague them for a lifetime. Some will turn to steroids or other
performance-enhancing substances to try to gain an edge. And some may give up on sports—and
exercise—altogether.”); Tom Withers, Study: Kids Burn Out with Focus on Sports, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), Jan. 8, 2006.
219
Catherine Holecko, Sportsmanship: Teach Your Kids About Winning and Losing in Sports,
ABOUT.COM, http://familyfitness.about.com/od/motivation/ss/sportsmanship.htm (last visited Sept. 2,
2010) (noting that forty million children per year participate); Carleton Kendrick, Why Most Kids Quit
Sports, FAMILYEDUCATION.COM, http://life.familyeducation.com/sports/behavior/29512.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2010) (noting that twenty million children per year participate in youth sports).
220
Kendrick, supra note 219.
221
Id.
222
See Joel S. Brenner & the Council on Sports Med. & Fitness, Overuse Injuries, Overtraining,
and Burnout in Child and Adolescent Athletes, 119 PEDIATRICS 1242, 1243 (2007) (“The pediatric
athlete may also have fatigue, lack of enthusiasm about practice or competition . . . .”); Heyward L.
Nash, Elite Child-Athletes: How Much Does Victory Cost?, 15 PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDINCINE 129,
129 (1987) (“[L]iving up to the standards of must-win situations is taking its toll on some childathletes, because it has added a large measure of stress to their lives.”); Thomas D. Raedeke et al.,
Understanding Athlete Burnout: Coach Perspectives, 25 J. SPORT BEHAV. 181, 182 (2002) (explaining
that the term “burnout” suggests “the image of bright, promising young athletes who get fed up with
sport participation and stop competing at what should be the top of their career”); Peter Cary, Think
Twice About Travel Teams, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 25, 2006, at 72 (“Burnout is a real
concern to coaches—some kids who have played intensively since age 10 are just flat-out tired of the
sport.”); Christy Damio, Playing it Safe, SCHOLASTIC ACTION, Nov. 13–27, 2006, at 34 (“Feeling
overworked and overtired is one of the main reasons teens give for quitting a sports team.”); Barbara
Kantrowitz et al., Don’t Just Do it For Daddy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 56 (“Often it is during
adolescence when parental pressure can produce burnout.”); Ron Kozlowski, Staying in the Game,
SARASOTA MAG., Dec. 1, 2000, at 147 (“When kids drop a sport cold turkey, coaches and parents often
decide it’s burnout.”).
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participation that, social science research shows, leads to “burnout.” For
these women, rather than being turned off of sport participation because
the culture persists, to some degree, in “anti-normalizing” sport
participation for women, it might be the result of the cost exacted by forced
assimilation into the male model for sport. As a result, guaranteeing
“equal opportunity to participate” is not a meaningful opportunity at all,
because women do not have the same incentives as men to persist in a
model for sport that was built by men for the purpose of masculinizing
men. The personal cost of such a model is too great for many women, and
ignoring this cost and advocating for ever more opportunities for women to
participate in it sends a message that the choice is assimilate or do not
participate at all.
The second group of women whose interest in sport is paradoxically
affected by Title IX’s Catch-22 consists of those women who do not
participate at all. For these women, the question of whether they might be
interested in assimilating into the male model for sport is complex, and one
must consider the many ways in which men and women may be the same
or different with respect to the male model for sport currently offered by
our educational institutions to determine whether a formal equality
approach, guaranteeing a right to assimilate, would provide opportunities
for sport that are as appealing to women as they are to men. That is,
perhaps women are, in all relevant respects, the “same” as men with
respect to sport. If so, an assimilation approach to equality should work to
attract women to sport. It is apparent, however, that women and men are
not completely the same when it comes to expressing themselves through
athletic participation.
To begin, the aspect of “sameness” that seems to animate arguments in
favor of gender equity in sport is that women have the same capacity to
benefit from sport as do males. Thus, proponents of Title IX point out that
sport participation can be a vehicle for learning important life lessons and
sport participation leads to better health and social outcomes.223 There is
little doubt that in this respect, men and women are the same, and there is
no relevant basis upon which to suggest that men have a greater capacity to
benefit from or entitlement to the benefits of sport.
The capacity to benefit from sport, however, may not be the only basis
upon which we should consider whether men and women are the “same”
with respect to participation in sport. A second way to view the issue, and
one that is also embraced by proponents of gender equity in sport, is
whether men and women are the same in terms of ability to play sport. It
is on this basis that, historically, women have been prevented from
participating in sport. Unfounded stereotypes about sport being dangerous
223
See supra Part II.B discussing the better physical and mental health and lower rates of teen
pregnancy and drug use among females who participate in sports.
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for women or ill-suited to women’s physicality because of their
childbearing role and supposedly delicate, frail nature have been soundly
debunked by Title IX.224 Although it might be said that physical
differences between men and women may lead to different styles of play,
this is not a relevant basis upon which to say that women are different from
men in terms of ability to play. Since Title IX, it has been accepted that
women’s bodies are able to engage in sport in the same way that men’s are.
Both the capacity to benefit from sport and ability to participate
provide powerful bases to assert that women are the same as men when it
comes to sport and being attracted to participate. These are not, however,
the only relevant bases for comparing women and men in terms of
developing the interest to participate in the male-constructed model for
sport that is incorporated into Title IX. As a result, both Title IX critics
and proponents of gender equity in sport miss the mark. Given the fact
that sport is socially constructed, and social conditioning historically has
discouraged women’s participation in sport, women’s lagging participation
rates cannot be used as evidence of an inherent disinterest in sport. Yet
discrimination in the form of a lack of enough participation opportunities
or social conditioning that devalues women’s participation also is too facile
an explanation. While such factors are partially the case, they fail to
account for the fact that while women have been conditioned not to pursue
sport, they also enjoy the freedom to opt out of the current model for sport.
This is because women, unlike males, do not need to participate in the
current model for sport to build, reinforce, or defend their gender
identity.225 As a result, a difference-maker with respect to participation
rates between the genders likely is that, as studies show, boys often need
the model for athletics offered by our educational institutions to establish
and fulfill their socially-constructed gender identity, and girls do not.226
Thus, because the model offered by our educational institutions is one
constructed with a primary purpose of masculinizing males, it should not
224
See BRAKE, supra note 3, at 47–48 (“Title IX has fueled the culture that has heightened
women’s interest in playing contact sports and society’s acceptance of them when they do. . . . The
increasing participation of female athletes in other contact sports, including football and ice hockey,
both reflects and reinforces Title IX’s transformative impact on the culture.”). But see MCDONAGH &
PAPPANO, supra note 66, at 183 (“Women also have been hampered by the presumption that they
are more frail than males and need protection. This protective impulse is embedded in Title IX
regulations . . . .”).
225
See MESSNER, supra note 152, at 8 (“Sport participation does offer young males a way into a
world of masculine values, rituals, and relationships.”).
226
Patricia A. Adler et al., Socialization to Gender Roles: Popularity Among Elementary School
Boys and Girls, 65 SOC. OF EDUC. 169, 170 (1992) (“[B]oys’ activities (e.g., sports) emphasiz[e] such
masculine values as achievement, toughness, endurance, competitiveness, and aggression and girls’
activities (e.g., cheerleading) foster[] emotional management, glamour, and a concern with
appearance.”); Lisa A. Harrison & Amanda B. Lynch, Social Role Theory and the Perceived Gender
Role Orientation of Athletes, 52 SEX ROLES 227, 228 (2005) (“[B]oys were more likely to wish to be
remembered as an athletic star, whereas girls were more likely to wish to be remembered as a school
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be surprising that men appear to be more interested in that construct.
Therefore, boys, despite the difficulties presented by the organized youth
sports culture and the prevailing education-based athletics model, tend to
continue their athletic participation in greater numbers than girls.227 This
does not mean that boys are more interested or deserving of athletic
opportunities, only that they have a greater incentive to withstand the perils
of the youth sport culture and exploitation228 of the varsity-athlete model.
Women, on the other hand, have the social freedom to opt out, and they do.
On this point, then, Title IX’s “Field of Dreams” narrative breaks
down for two reasons. First, it is built on an essentialist view of what
women are interested in when it comes to sport participation. Second, it
assumes that women and girls are simply victims of discrimination when it
comes to sport, so that their choices not to participate reflect this
victimization instead of an exercise of their agency, which they are using
to reject a model for sport that is, for many, destructive and unappealing.229
Essentialism in feminist legal discourse is of course not new, but the fact
that it can serve to produce such a paradoxical effect in the Title IX context
by undermining efforts to increase women’s participation in sport runs
counter to the conventional wisdom. Feminist legal scholars have stated
that Title IX is “anti-essentialist” in that it has re-defined what it means to
be a student-athlete, from only male to male or female.230 While this is
true, in a far more powerful way, Title IX falls into the essentialist
227
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce
& Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 104th Cong. 196 (1995) (statement of
Donna Lopiano, Exec. Dir., Women’s Sport Found.).
228
Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the
NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 266 (2008); Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring
Educational Primacy to College Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 602 (2002) (“Many
basketball players enter college academically deficient. Add to this deficiency, forty to sixty hours per
week of athletic activities, and missed classes, and the result is an athlete unlikely to graduate. In fact,
only forty-three percent of all NCAA basketball players graduate within six years and, of those athletes
who do graduate, many do not receive a meaningful degree. As a result, some critics condemn
Division I basketball programs for exploiting athletes until the end of their eligibility and then
summarily discarding them.” (footnotes omitted)); Eric J. Sobocinski, College Athletes: What Is Fair
Compensation?, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 257, 272–73 (1996) (“[C]olleges and universities compete for
the recruitment of athletes. Herein lies the root for unethical behavior by colleges and universities.
The win-at-all-costs attitude is emphasized at some universities and colleges, resulting in an extreme
compromise of ethics. By overemphasizing winning, colleges and universities compromise their
academic mission of producing true student-athletes. Colleges and universities engaging in neglectful
behavior are merely exploiting the student-athlete for their own profit.” (footnotes omitted)).
229
See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 330–32 (1995) (explaining the views of some female writers that “[w]omen are
actors capable of making choices for themselves, notwithstanding the fact that they may be subject to
various gender-based pressures and dangers”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 613 (1990) (“[T]he story of woman as passive victim denies the
ability of women to shape their own lives, whether for better or worse.”).
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Cohen, supra note 156, at 180 (“Ultimately, Title IX is, in substantial part, a statute about antiessentialism.”); see also BRAKE, supra note 3, at 36–38 (“In the final analysis, Title IX has chosen the
right priority: expanding girls’ and women’s participation in sports through a substantive approach to
measuring equality in athletic opportunities.”).
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tendencies of the early feminist movement. The notion of “essentialism”
can be traced to critiques of early feminist discourse231 which were said to
“essentialize” women—assuming that a “unitary, ‘essential’ women’s
experience can be isolated and described” independent of the realities of
experience.232 Thus, feminist scholars have explained that early feminist
legal theory, particularly the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Robin
West, assumed that there is “an essential ‘woman’ beneath the realities of
differences between women.”233 So-called “second phase” feminist
theorists pointed out that, in fact, previous descriptions of what it meant to
be a “woman” were often descriptions of the experiences of white, middleclass women.234 Thus, feminist analysis progressed to account for
inequalities that were not simply traced to gender oppression against
middle-class white women, but were experienced in relation to other “axes
of power” such as race, class, age, and sexuality.235
To some extent, there has been an accounting of the essentialism
embedded in Title IX. For instance, scholars have explained that Title IX,
like other early feminist work, in many ways leaves out African American
women and girls.236 Yet even these critiques do not express what is Title
IX’s central flaw, which is that the “structural,” “Field of Dreams” theory
of equality relies on an essentialized understanding of what women want
from sport. Indeed, Title IX theory and advocacy assumes that in the
context of sport, there is one, unitary experience for all females in that all
females are “interested” in becoming “varsity” athletes and assimilating
into the male-constructed model for sport. Accordingly, although Title IX
may have an “anti-essentialist” feature, the statute and regulations, and
those who support them, have in an important way essentialized women
once again—instead of assuming women cannot or do not want to be
athletes, Title IX reflects the view that all women want the same
experience from sport. In fact, women and girls likely experience sport in
multiple ways, with power being wielded through sport not simply through
the fact of gender alone, but through male-created and dominated
231

Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 34
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Harris, supra note 229, at 585 (referring to the practice as “gender essentialism”); see also
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structures that privilege “winners” and “elites,” regardless of gender, and
denigrate those who engage in athletics simply for the sake of
participation, social connection, community building, or health and well
being. This essentialization, long thought to be a hallmark of feminist
theorizing of the 1970s and 1980s, persists in Title IX today, so that the
post-modern critiques of feminist legal theory seemingly have not
infiltrated theory and practice on this front.237
In addition, the “Field of Dreams” theory breaks down because it
assumes women are simply victims of discrimination when it comes to
choosing whether to participate in sport, instead of rational actors
exercising agency in determining whether to continue participating in the
flawed education-based sport culture or authentically rejecting such
participation at all. Thus, the existing scholarly and popular discourse,
rooted in the structural equality theory, holds that women and girls today
have their interest in sports participation “extinguished” because of the
continuing presence of sex discrimination in sport.238 As one Title IX
advocate put it, “[r]esearch shows that . . . by the age of 14, girls drop out
of sport at a significantly greater rate than men. Little wonder. Girls and
women simply do not receive the same opportunities as boys to play or the
same positive reinforcement about their sports participation.”239 Similarly,
it has been said that “[s]ocial structures, including signals from universities
that devalue women’s sports as compared to men’s, have influenced
women’s interests in athletics and are responsible, to some degree, for lack
of athletic interest among women.”240 Accordingly, scholars have
explained that “taking into account women’s lack of interest in athletics
relative to their male peers is ineffective and circular.”241 While such
reasoning is undoubtedly a partial explanation for women and girls’ lack of
sustained participation in sport, it wholly ignores the possibility that
women and girls are not just victims of discrimination, but are making
choices to opt out of a model for sport that does not speak to them.
Accordingly, the structural theory of equality fails to account for the many
237
That this “first-phase” feminist limitation has not been addressed in Title IX could be due to
the fact that, as Martha Chamallas states, Title IX has not captured the interest of feminist thinkers. See
CHAMALLAS, supra note 78, at 63 (“In the area of sports, feminists have not regarded gender
integration of elite men’s teams as the primary goal . . . .”). It seems that Title IX is seen as a feminist
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voices that have spoken, through the culture of burnout or no participation
at all. In fact, the structural theory of equality de-legitimizes these voices
of disinterest, by arguing that they are simply the product of social
conditioning.242 By not giving full consideration to the voice of a girl who
fails to take up sports, or who, after participating, gives it up, we have
fallen into the same, all-too-familiar pattern of assuming that the
experience of one type of woman—in this case, the type that seeks243 and
enjoys currently-constructed notions of varsity sport—represents all
women who might be interested in the experience of sport. We also miss
an important opportunity to consider what model might speak to more
women and girls, and advocate for that, instead of simply more of the
same.
As a result, Title IX creates and perpetuates an interest paradox
because of several faulty premises with respect to women and sport. The
first is the false neutrality of the content of “varsity” athletics and a
student-athlete with the “ability” to play.244 It is apparent that such
descriptions are not neutral at all, but are constructed by and for males and
the process of masculinization. Second, the interest paradox develops
because Title IX advocates—and the structural theory of equality
incorporated into Title IX—rely upon an essentialized vision of what
women want from “sport.” Finally, the interest paradox develops because
the theory of equality embedded in Title IX assumes that women solely
develop a relationship with sport, or not, based on the presence or absence
of gender discrimination in the form of too few opportunities to participate
or too little benefits if they do. Accordingly, assuming women are
interested in assimilating into a falsely neutral model for sport designed by
and for men has resulted in the perpetuation of a model for sport in our
educational institutions that seemingly, based on participation statistics,245
does not speak to a significant number of girls and women—whatever their
needs and interests in sport may be. This is a type of gender discrimination
in sport that is not addressed by Title IX, and current participation and
obesity statistics for women and girls show it begs a response.246
IV. AVOIDING THE INTEREST PARADOX:
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
To be sure, it is clear that Title IX has done a great deal of good to stir
242
This can be traced to the “dominance” theory of power put forth most notably by Catharine
MacKinnon, which “conceives of women, their wants and needs, as completely constructed by
patriarchal power.” Eichner, supra note 231, at 9.
243
And, of course, has the socio-economic means to do so.
244
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 1513 (explaining that scholars have unmasked the
“disempowering, unequalizing effect” of standards that appear to have “neutral objectivity”).
245
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
246
See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
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interest in athletics and open up the student-athlete experience for women
who are genuinely interested in assimilating into the male-constructed,
varsity model of sport (or who see assimilation as a better alternative than
not participating at all). As a result, this Article should not be read to
suggest that Title IX enforcement is not an important legal and public
policy matter. For this subset of females, existing case law and legal
scholarship, as well as popular advocacy efforts, do well to advance their
cause. This Article, however, is concerned with the persistent—and
substantial—population of females who do not pursue “varsity” athletics,
or who initially participate and then quit. For this group, the “Field of
Dreams” theory of equality is limited—little in sport is being built by or
for women, or even with women in mind. This is because, in the final
analysis, Title IX merely guarantees an opportunity to assimilate and be
“one of the boys.” To realize deeper change and allow women and girls to
find their identity within education-based athletic programs, we must look
for solutions that will serve as meaningful encouragement for more women
and girls to take up and benefit from sport to the same extent that the
current model does for men. We must, therefore, go beyond Title IX to
fully realize gender equity in sport.
Moving beyond Title IX should not be, as some might fear, threatening
to the cause of gender equality in sport. To the extent such advocacy is
viewed as an implicit acknowledgement that women are not as interested
in sport as men, and therefore not deserving of participation opportunities
to the same extent as men, the answer is simply that it should be expected
that women’s interest lags behind that of males. The model of sport
offered by our educational institutions is a model that was created by and
for men. As a result, there has never been, and due to the equality structure
of Title IX, there will not under current law be, much room for women’s
voices in the prevailing model of education-based sport. The question,
therefore, can no longer be whether women are “interested” in a so-called
objective experience known as “sport.” Instead, the question now is
whether, and when, women will be permitted to shape the educational
sporting experience to the same extent historically enjoyed by men. Only
then can we discuss “interest” in any respect beyond an interest in
assimilation. Moving beyond Title IX, then, is not a threat to achieving
gender equity in sport. It is essential to achieving it.
Moreover, calling for an education-based sport policy beyond Title IX
does not mean women need “special treatment” or that women are
inherently less interested in highly competitive sport. The recognition that
women differ from males in the sense that women do not need the current
model of sport offered in our educational institutions to establish their
gender identity is not to suggest that women are either not deserving of
gender equity in sport or the converse, that they require “special treatment”
with respect to sport in the form of a different model from that which is
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provided to men. It does mean, however, that educational institutions
should no longer sponsor athletic programs that are designed only with
men in mind.247 Because women have only in the last few decades been
admitted to the world of athletics, and their admission came into a world
constructed by males, it is now time to move to a level of equality that
gives women an equal opportunity to shape the student-athlete
experience—to define what a student athlete is and should be.248
Accordingly, the issue should no longer be whether women are interested
in sport, but what model of sport they might be interested in.
Given Title IX’s limits, shaping an education-based sporting
experience that speaks to women as much as our current model speaks to
men will require Congress, for the first time, to articulate a policy249 for
such sport that addresses Title IX’s unfinished business.250 To do this,
Congress must reconsider the deference traditionally given to educational
institutions to construct their athletic programs251 and reconsider the
prevailing view that sport is essentially a matter for the private sector.252
Such a “hands off,” deferential approach is no longer justified given the
significant public health benefits that accrue to individuals who participate
in sport. Instead, unlike Title IX itself, a new legislative initiative should
define in clearer terms a substantive content for education-based sports
programs which goes beyond the current “varsity” model and draws on
principles and values that are more inclusive than the male-constructed,
247
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (“[I]mplicit in certain strands
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248
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249
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competitive sports model that is incorporated into Title IX. As a starting
point in this effort, as explained below, such a policy should resist an
essentialized vision of what women and girls are interested in or want from
athletic programs. Second, any public policy effort must clearly define the
priorities for education-based sport programs as encouraging participation,
fitness, and positive life lessons more than elite competition and
commercial appeal. Third, such a policy should be constructed by
listening to a diverse group of women’s voices, beyond the predominantly
white, middle-class population that traditionally has enjoyed a large
proportion of Title IX’s benefits. Finally, a new education-based sport
policy must offer more participation opportunities and choices in the
elementary and middle school years.
As a first step in creating this new education-based sport policy, it is
imperative that we stop asserting that women are “interested” in athletics
using an essentialized vision of women athletes and what women want
from athletic participation. Instead, Congress should shape a policy that
provides for a variety of experiences that appeal to a diverse population of
women and girls. This is, of course, easier said than done. For instance,
recently it was reported that flag football for girls has achieved great
popularity in some high schools across the country.253 Some scholars,
however, are concerned about schools adding the sport, viewing it as a
cynical attempt to comply with Title IX.254 While the flag football
example may in fact be an attempt by schools to comply with Title IX that
is not in the spirit of the law or consistent with a model of athletics that
emphasizes elite opportunities and commercial appeal, we must not be so
quick to dismiss these initiatives. With the flag football example,
thousands of girls have turned out to play. We should try to understand
why a new sport like this is appealing, and offer more opportunities that
spark such interest. Moreover, we must give voice to those who are not
currently interested in participating in sport by recognizing that the social
conditioning which influences participation in sport goes beyond gender
discrimination, and includes the model for sport which predominates in our
educational institutions. Thus, rather than viewing them exclusively as
victims of discrimination, women and girls who fail to participate in sport
should be viewed as exercising at least partial agency by making authentic
choices. These choices include rejecting a model for sport with few, if
any, attributes which reflect a broader range of women’s needs and
experiences, and which serves to alienate a sizeable number of females and
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males alike.
As it stands, we do not fully listen to or value the voice of
non-participants, because we have assumed that it is not authentic. A new
education-based sport policy should therefore not be so quick to assume
that more of the same when it comes to the model for sport offered will
yield greater interest in participation.
Moreover, to incorporate more women’s voices into any proposed
public policy solutions for increasing women’s participation in sport, we
must look beyond the voices of white, middle-class women and understand
the needs of women who historically and persistently have been excluded
from the Title IX success story, such as women and girls of color,256
women of different ethnic backgrounds, women from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, and women with physical challenges. For
instance, research shows that Latina girls face particular barriers to
participation in athletics and might be interested in models that do not
demand the single-mindedness and time commitments of the traditional
varsity model.257 In addition, physically-challenged women have been left
out of the gender equity in sport movement almost completely. The malecrafted varsity model for sport ensures this exclusion, by reinforcing an
ideology of able-bodiedness and a definition of ability to engage in sport
that denies the possibility of meaningful sport participation for those who
do not possess current social constructs of sport “skill” and “talent.”
Taking into account these experiences and considering the sporting needs
of a wider group of women and girls will require us to step back from our
preconceived notions of what sport is and what sport is for, to envision a
policy that casts a far wider net and provides far more opportunities for
physical expression than our current varsity model does. Moreover, while
we look with pride on the many, many women who have successfully
assimilated into the male, varsity model, we must not let that pride help
define what women should be interested in or have the ability to do.
In addition to moving beyond our essentialized vision of women and
sport, a new education-based sport policy must clearly define the priorities
255
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256
See Mathewson, supra note 236, at 250–51 (discussing the increased level of female minority
participation in collegiate athletics). Research shows that athletic opportunity is particularly important
for minority women, as “[m]inority female athletes experience higher levels of self-esteem, are more
likely to participate in extracurricular activities, and are more likely to become leaders in their
communities than minority girls who do not play sports.” Minority girls who are involved in athletics
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for athletic programs conducted in this context. The “interest paradox”
fostered by Title IX occurs because, in a sense, we expect Title IX to
deliver benefits that it is not constructed to deliver. On the one hand,
arguments in support of Title IX state that gender equity in sport is
necessary to bring the benefits of sport participation to women and girls.
The prevailing varsity model for sport incorporated into Title IX, however,
is neither necessary nor sufficient to deliver these benefits to a large
segment of women and girls. This is because the varsity model, based on
elite competition and commercial appeal, is not the only model that can
promote an increased sense of physical agency, physical fitness, and
healthy self-esteem. Moreover, the varsity model will only attract a certain
population of girls and women who want to meet its professional-level
demands. Title IX’s “Field of Dreams” approach therefore conflates the
benefits of sport participation with the benefits of varsity level
competition. While both sport models can deliver important life
experiences and lessons that government should encourage women to
seek,258 both do not stir women’s interest in sport equally effectively, and
the creation of more elite opportunities to participate at the college level
has not as effectively attracted a larger population of females to seek out
the benefits of sport participation. A new education-based sport policy
should therefore define what the priorities are—to give some individuals
an elite athlete experience? To emphasize values such as participation and
fitness? Our current approach makes Title IX responsible for all of this
and more, and the result is the “interest paradox,” with seemingly greater
numbers of women and girls getting turned off to sport rather than
developing a lasting commitment to it.
Similarly, while crafting an education-based sport policy that includes
more voices in terms of the type of model offered, and clearly defines what
the goals for education-based sport are, we must acknowledge that the
current model is not the only objective way to structure education-based
athletics, and be open to alternatives. Of course, the current model has
been long criticized for its emphasis on commercialism over academics259
and its propensity for exploiting athletes, especially in revenue-generating
sports.260 Little has been written, however, about whether the model is one
that equally can attract the interest of both men and women. Thus,
alternative models for sport in the educational setting must be considered
with gender equity firmly in mind. For instance, research on sport
motivation has shown that “American college athletes develop competitive
258
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259
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motives for sport participation, with males generally expressing a greater
competitive motivation than females.”261 Similarly, social science research
has shown that men place greater importance on the competitive motive for
sport participation.262 Indeed, the “socialization of American males into
competitive sport carries with it an emphasis on skill and victory.”263 Yet
while typical varsity athletes enjoy the benefits of sports participation, they
must also endure the perils of the varsity sport culture, such as sportrelated injuries and having to adopt a win-at-all costs attitude.264 Instead,
in defining a new education-based sport policy, Congress should look
beyond elite competitive values for models that emphasize other
motivations for sport participation, such as health and fitness, social
connection, and community building.265 Indeed, there were alternate
models for education-based sport put forth by women athletic
administrators prior to Title IX.266 To the extent models of sport
emphasizing these values might resonate with a greater population of
females, and be more consistent with the academic mission of the
institutions which sponsor athletics programs, Title IX allows no guarantee
of equal opportunity to advance them. Moreover, while it is difficult to
find any models for sport in the United States that do not stress
competition,267 this thinking must change if we are to develop interest in
participating in a greater population of females. A new sport policy that
seeks to distribute the benefits of sport to more women must therefore
establish new norms for sport that speak to a broader population.
In addition to considering a greater range of models for educationbased sport, we must develop a policy that includes more choices for sport
participation in the elementary and middle school years. This is important
for several reasons. First, more choices through schools in earlier years
will help eliminate socio-economic barriers to sport participation. In
addition, more education-based sport in elementary and middle school
settings will reinforce a norm of participation from the bottom up, instead
261
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of relying on inspiration in the form of elite college and Olympic athletes
to drive interest from the top down. Moreover, more athletic participation
in elementary and middle schools will provide more opportunities for
women to be involved in charting a direction for education-based sports.
Perhaps more than anything, allowing women to administer athletic
programs and coach athletes, both male and female, is enormously
important and has ramifications well beyond the individual woman who
holds the position. It is administrators and coaches who define which
athletes will have access to athletic resources and what those athletes will
have to do to continue having access. It is those administrators who set the
agenda for how athletics will fit into the educational structure of the
institution. After Title IX, women athletic leaders largely were sidelined
by men in sports leadership positions.268 Indeed, it has been explained that
one result of Title IX is that “most women’s athletic programs are now
governed by the NCAA, where control is largely in the hands of men.”269
Also, since Title IX was enacted, the proportion of women athletic
administrators and coaches has declined in both high schools and
universities,270 and women continue to be excluded from most positions of
power and influence in education-based sports contexts.271 Accordingly,
increasing women’s voices in athletics must not rely simply on an
approach whereby we increase the numbers of women who participate in
sport. Efforts must also be made to increase the numbers of women who
administer sport programs and coach female (and male) athletes, so that
women’s voices are injected from the top down as well.272
More opportunities at the elementary and middle school levels will
also provide a means for integrating sports teams. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine women’s voices becoming equally valued in structuring the way
in which athletics is conducted in the educational setting given that through
segregated teams, men still enjoy the privilege of setting the standard for
268
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how sport should be. That is, by maintaining their separate teams, men
maintain their dominance over the model of sport offered, because it is
they who set the definition of what a student-athlete is, and it is
acknowledged that women cannot compete with them, for the standards are
set to reward male physical dominance. Traditional arguments in favor of
the separate teams philosophy is that for women to have a chance to make
teams (and play safely), they must be given their own teams because men,
due to their size and strength advantages, will always dominate sports
teams. Such arguments are based on the unstated assumption that athletics
has as its purpose elite-level performance and an emphasis on competition
instead of participation. Because concerns over size and strength
advantages of males over females are not as immediate, if they are present
at all, in younger children, gender integration of sports teams at these
levels can be used as a means to further erode the standard of male
supremacy and the male performance norm in sports. Moreover,
institutions could be mandated to structure their teams based on levels of
play, size, or age, instead of using gender as a proxy for size and ability.
Thus, whatever the details, it is apparent that it is time to seek public
policy solutions in addition to Title IX to address the percentage of girls
and women who do not participate in sport in rates equivalent to boys and
men. Because sport is merely a social construct,273 and not an absolute, we
should be open to new models emphasizing a greater array of values than
those which are intended to be for the socialization of males.274 Such
solutions would have the benefit not only of opening up the world of
athletics to an even greater population of women, but to the many men who
are left out of our current elite, competitive model for sport as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Title IX was a product of its time. Like other feminist efforts of the
early 1970s, Title IX ultimately is built on a formal equality framework.
Notwithstanding the “substantive” or “structural” equality elements
requiring educational institutions to create opportunities and develop
interest in sport participation, Title IX did not require that the model for
sport offered, constructed by and for men, change. Indeed, it requires that
women be similarly situated to males in that women must be “interested”
and have the “ability” to play varsity-level sport, as that is defined by
273
M. Ann Hall, The Discourse of Gender and Sport: From Femininity to Feminism, 5 SOC.
SPORT J. 330, 331 (1988) (“Like all other forms of culture, sport is a creation of human agency and it
can be transformed.”).
274
As Deborah Brake explains, “[m]any of the benefits of sports, including improved physical
fitness, socialization opportunities and leadership development might be better promoted by a more
inclusive model of sports that values widespread participation and enjoyment in sports over elite
competition.” Brake, Pragmatic Feminism, supra note 113, at 541.

456

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:401

institutions sponsoring sports programs. An examination of the normative
content of varsity sport shows that it was defined without the benefit of
women’s voices or experiences, but only with the needs and desires of
male athletes, and men, in mind. The result is that Title IX requires
women to assimilate into the male model for sport, something that many
women have benefitted from, but many more reject.
Prevailing theoretical understandings of Title IX, told through the
“Field of Dreams” narrative, posits that more opportunities to participate in
the male model for sport will serve to inspire more girls and women to
participate. This Article suggests that such an approach reflects an
essentialized view of what women want from sport, and it discounts the
many voices of women who might benefit from and be interested in a
model that emphasizes values broader than those traditionally associated
with making “boys” into “men.” As a result, Title IX’s conception of
equality has created an interest paradox—discouraging interest in athletics
in the very population Title IX is meant to serve.
This Article suggests that this interest paradox should be
acknowledged, so that discussions of gender equity in sport can move from
polarizing, and ultimately unproductive debates about whether women are,
or are not, inherently interested in athletics, to a more nuanced discussion
of exactly what models of athletics a greater population of women might
be interested in. Thus, it is only when women have an equal opportunity to
participate in creating and defining the social construct that is athletics will
we have realized gender equity in sport.

